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Abstract: This article reviews the literature critiquing the UNDP’s Gender-related Development 
Index (GDI), which is a measure of human development penalized for the extent of gender inequality 
in each country; presents several original critiques of GDI; and presents proposed corrections to the 
GDI in response to both received and original critiques. 
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The Gender-related Development Index (GDI), published annually since 1995 in the United 
Nations Development Program’s (UNDP’s) Human Development Report (HDR), is designed to 
highlight gender disparities in human development. A variation on the Human Development 
Index (HDI), GDI is a composite index used to rank human well-being among 140 countries. 
Measures of life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrollment, and income per capita are first 
assigned a penalty based on the extent of gender inequality present in a given nation and then 
combined in a formula identical to that of HDI.1 The difference between HDI and GDI can be 
interpreted as a gender-inequality penalty. GDI, then, is not a measure of women’s development, 
nor of gender inequality, but rather a measure of human development that includes health, 
education, and income, plus the degree to which the well-being of a society as a whole suffers as 
a result of any gender disparity in access to these three proxies for human capabilities.  
This chapter questions whether or not GDI, as currently constructed, achieves the best possible 
measure of gender-inequality-sensitive human development. I begin with an examination of the 
quality of the data used to calculate GDI and the appropriateness of the components chosen to 
assess gender inequality. Without a strong foundation of high-quality data well-suited to drawing 
attention to disparities between women and men, all the calculations that follow are irrelevant. 
Key questions include: How good are the data that are used in computing GDI? Is GDI based on 
the data most appropriate to measuring gender inequality?  
Special attention is given to the estimation of women’s and men’s incomes used in GDI. Unlike 
for life expectancy, literacy, and school enrollment, gender-specific income data do not exist for 
most countries. The techniques used to first estimate gendered incomes and then discount them 
to reflect diminishing marginal utility have important effects on GDI values. How best can 
gendered incomes be estimated in the absence of data, or is there a better way to measure 
women’s material well-being? How best can gendered incomes be adjusted for diminishing 
returns to each new unit of income?  
In constructing GDI, indices for health, education, and income are generated, and then these 
three indices are combined in a simple, unweighted average. While on the surface this implies a 
balance of importance among the gender-inequality penalties for the three components, implicit 
weights may exist if the range of the component penalties is imbalanced. Does each of the 
components have the same average impact on the final GDI value? 
The health, education, and income indices are assigned penalties for the extent of gender 
inequalities in a formula that includes female and male population shares, the gender-specific 
component indices, and a parameter representing society’s aversion to gender inequality. The 
value assigned to gender inequality’s impact on overall human development, the treatment of 
                                                 
1 HDI is the mean of component indices for health (based on average life expectancy), education (based on literacy 
and school enrollment rates), and income (based on purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita. 
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cases where female indices exceed males, and the effect of particularly uneven female and male 
population shares each can have unexpected, and unintended, consequences for GDI. How strong 
is society’s aversion to gender inequality, and is this reflected in GDI? Should female advantages 
in capabilities be treated the same as male advantages when measuring gender inequality? What 
effect does a disproportionately small female population have on GDI values?  
After the data are chosen, gendered income is estimated, penalties are assigned, and components 
are averaged together, the resulting GDI is expected to differ from HDI. That difference 
represents the loss of well-being due to gender inequality in each country. How large are the 
differences between HDI and GDI, and do they accurately portray levels of gender inequality?  
Finally, in order for GDI to be useful not just to economists but to policy-makers, development 
professionals, and a broader public, GDI must not only be distinguishable from HDI. It also must 
be clear and relatively simple. Is the GDI accessible to policy-makers and development 
practitioners world-wide? Or does it require a specialist to calculate it, or even to interpret it? 
Before embarking on an examination of these concerns in greater detail, the next section of this 
chapter will explain the construction of the GDI. 
 
Understanding the GDI2
GDI is a social welfare function that includes health, education, income, and the degree to which 
a country’s aggregate wel-being suffers as a result of gender disparities in the availability of 
these three capabilities. More specifically, the GDI is a variation on the HDI in which each 
component – life expectancy, adult literacy, school enrollment, and income – is penalized for its 
extent of gender inequality before the four components are combined into a single index. GDI is 
not a measure of women’s development, nor is it a measure of gender inequality. Instead it is a 
measure of overall human development that takes into consideration gender disparities’ negative 
impacts on the average well-being of an entire society.  
Each of the four components of GDI uses the same basic formula to penalize gender disparities. 
First, female and male-specific indices are calculated using the same normalization method as in 
HDI: 
Female Actual Value i – Female Minimum Value (1) Female-Indexi = Female Maximum Value – Female Minimum Value 
 
Male Actual Value i – Male Minimum Value (2) Male-Indexi = Male Maximum Value – Male Minimum Value 
 
where the subscript i indicates the country. 
                                                 
2 The GDI values used throughout this chapter are based on the author’s replication, made necessary because GDI’s 
component indices and penalties are not reported in the HDRs. For 2003 data by gender for all 140 countries, as 
reported in HDR 2005, see Appendix A. For a discussion of the method of replication used in this study and values 
of component Equally Distributed Indices see Appendix B.  
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Then the female and male indices for each component, along with the female and male 
population shares (FemalePopShare and MalePopShare) are combined to form an “Equally 
Distributed Index” (ED Index) using the following formula:  
(3) ED-Indexi = [(FemalePopSharei * Female-Indexi1-ε) + (MalePopSharei * Male-Indexi1-ε)]1/1-ε
The parameter ε represents aversion to inequality. On the choice of values for ε the HDR 2005 
(UNDP 2005: 344) states the following:  
The value of ε is the size of the penalty for gender inequality. The larger the value, the more 
heavily a society is penalized for having inequalities. If ε = 0, gender inequality is not penalized 
(in this case the GDI would have the same value as the HDI). As ε increases towards infinity, 
more and more weight is given to the lesser achieving group. The value 2 is used in calculating 
the GDI…This value places a moderate penalty on gender inequality in achievement. 
When ε = 0, the above formula becomes the arithmetic mean weighted by female and male 
populations shares, and the resulting index should be equal to the component index for the whole 
population as used in HDI.3 When, as in the calculations for the GDI, ε = 2, the above formula 
becomes the harmonic mean weighted by the population shares (UNDP 1995: 73).4 Any 
difference between the female index and the male index – regardless of its direction – is 
penalized in the ED Index. This is to say that – for all three components – the Equally 
Distributed formula can only impose a penalty, not award a bonus. 
 
Equally Distributed Health Index 
The Equally Distributed Health Index (EDH) is calculated using female and male life expectancy 
data, primarily from the UN’s Department of Economic and Social Affairs. The minimum and 
maximum life expectancies values used by the UNDP to normalize the Female and Male Health 
Indices are 27.5 and 87.5, and 22.5 and 82.5, respectively. The five-year difference between 
these ranges is attributed to the difference in women’s and men’s actual average life spans.5 The 
harmonic mean of these two indices, weighted by their population shares, is then taken, resulting 
in the EDH: 
Female LE i – 27.5 years (4) Female-H-Indexi = 87.5 years – 27.5 years 
 
Male LE i – 22.5 years (5) Male-H-Indexi = 82.5 years – 22.5 years
 
(6) EDHi = [(FemalePopSharei * Female-H-Indexi1-ε) + (MalePopSharei * Male-H-Indexi1-ε)]1/1-ε
 
                                                 
3 The resulting index should be, but is not, equal to the component index for the whole population as used in HDI. I 
return to this point below. 
4 A harmonic mean is equal to n/(1/x1  + 1/x2  +…+ 1/xn), where n is the number of terms. 
5 For debate regarding the accuracy, meaning, and policy implications of the five-year gap in expected life spans see 
Dijkstra (2006) and Klasen (2006). 
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 Equally Distributed Education Index 
For most countries, HDR 2005’s Equally Distributed Education Index (EDE) relies on gendered 
adult literacy and combined gross school enrollment data from the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization’s Institute for Statistics. Since the literacy and enrollment 
data are percentages, they are already normalized between 0 and 100.6 The literacy and 
enrollment data for each gender are combined in a weighted average (with literacy receiving 
twice the weight of enrollment) to form the Female and Male Education Indices. The harmonic 
mean of these two indices, weighted by their population shares, is then taken to calculate the 
EDE: 
 (7) Female-E-Indexi =  2/3(Female Literacy Indexi) + 1/3(Female Enrollment Indexi) 
 
(8) Male-E-Indexi =  2/3(Male Literacy Indexi) + 1/3(Male Enrollment Indexi) 
 
(9) EDEi = [(FemalePopSharei * Female-E-Indexi1-ε) + (MalePopSharei * Male-E-Indexi1-ε)]1/1-ε
 
 
Equally Distributed Income Index 
The calculation of the Equally Distributed Income Index (EDY) is somewhat more complex than 
that of the other component indices because data on income by gender are not readily available. 
In order to overcome this absence of data, the UNDP makes the assumption that the female share 
of a country’s gross domestic product (GDP) is equal to the female share of wages.7 The 
UNDP’s (1995) female “estimated earned income” (Yf) is, therefore, equal to the female share of 
the wage bill (Sf) times GDP divided by the female population (Nf):  
Sf * GDP(10) Yf = Nf
 
Using data from the International Labour Organizations’s (ILO’s) LABORSTA database, the 
UNDP calculates the female share of the wage bill, using the ratio of female to male non-
agricultural average hourly wages (Wf/Wm) as a proxy for the female to male ratio of all wages 
in a given country, and the ratio of female to male shares of the economically active population 
(EAf/EAm) as a proxy for the ratio of female to male paid hours worked. The female to male ratio 
of shares of the wage bill is the wage ratio weighted by the economically active population 
ratio:8
                                                 
6 The same result can, of course, be reached by using the normalization formula and applying 0 and 100 as the 
minimum and maximum values. 
7 GDP and GDP per capita refer to purchasing-power-parity (PPP) adjusted U.S. dollars throughout this chapter. 
8 If the female and male shares of the economically active population are equal (EAf/EAm=1), then the female to 
male ratio of shares of the wage bill (Sf/Sm) will equal the female to male wage ratio (Wf/Wm). If instead the female 
share of the economically active population is larger than the male share (EAf/EAm>1), then (Sf/Sm) will be greater 
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Sf Wf EAf(11) Sm
= Wm
* EAm
 
Solving for the female and male shares of the wage bill: 
Wf/Wm * EAf (12) Sf = (Wf/Wm *EAf) + EAm
 
(13) Sm = 1 - Sf
 
GDP is then multiplied by the female or male share of income and divided by the female or male  
population to result in that gender’s estimated earned income: 
Sf * GDP(14) Yf = Nf
 
Sm * GDP(15) Ym= Nm
 
In all countries, the resulting female estimated earned income is smaller than male estimated 
earned income.  
The Female and Male Income Indices are calculated using a normalization formula designed to 
correct for diminishing marginal returns to income by taking the natural logarithms of the actual, 
minimum, and maximum values.9 The minimum and maximum values used to normalize the 
Female and Male Income Indices are $100 and $40,000; this maximum level effectively acts as a 
cap on income in the male index, since five countries have male estimated earned incomes higher 
than $40,000. The harmonic mean of these two indices, weighted by their population shares, is 
then taken to calculate the EDY: 
ln(Female Y i) – ln($100) (16) Female-Y-Indexi =  ln($40,000) – ln($100) 
 
ln(Male Y i) – ln($100)(17) Male-Y-Indexi = ln($40,000) – ln($100) 
 
(18) EDYi = [(FemalePopSharei * Female-Y-Indexi1-ε) + (MalePopSharei * Male-Y-Indexi1-ε)]1/1-ε
 
Table 1 reports the range of each Equally Distributed Index for 2003 as presented in HDR 2005. 
                                                                                                                                                             
than (Wf/Wm), and if the female share of the economically active population is smaller than the male share 
(EAf/EAm<1), then (Sf/Sm) will be smaller than (Wf/Wm).  
9 For more information on the logarithmic income conversion method now used in HDI and GDI, see Anand and 
Sen (2000). 
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Health Education Income
ED Index high Japan 0.948 Australia, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, UK 0.993 Luxembourg, Norway 0.988
    Female high value Japan 85.4 years Literacy: 39 countries 99.0% Enrollment: UK 133% Luxembourg $34,890
    Male high value Iceland, Hong Kong 78.7 years
Literacy: 45 countries 99.0% 
Enrollment: Australia 114% Luxembourg $89,883
ED Index low Swaziland 0.114 Niger, Burkina Faso 0.154 Sierra Leone 0.249
    Female low value Swaziland 32.9 years Literacy: Burkina Faso 8.1% Enrollment: Bhutan 14% Sierra Leone $325
    Male low value Swaziland 32.1 years Literacy: Burkina Faso 18.5% Enrollment: Bhutan 16% Malawi $717
Table 1: Component Index Data (2003)
Source: HDR 2005 and author’s calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
 
Gender-related Development Index 
In the final step, GDI is calculated by taking the arithmetic mean of the EDLE, EDE, and EDY: 
(19) GDIi  =  (1/3)EDH i + (1/3)EDE i + (1/3)EDY i 
 
Using 2003 data, GDI values range from 0.961 in Norway to 0.271 in Niger, the same two 
countries that rank first and last in HDI (UNDP 2005). In between, a number of countries change 
rank due to greater or lesser degrees of gender inequality.  
For more than ten years, GDI has been a powerful tool – and very nearly the only available tool – 
for comparing human well-being, adjusted for gender inequality, among countries and for 
observing how each country has changed over time. But does GDI present an accurate picture of 
gender-inequality-adjusted human development? If it doesn’t, in what ways is it distorted? And 
what are the consequences of an image that is blurred or out of proportion?  
 
Critiques of GDI 
Many serious questions have been raised in the development economics literature about just how 
accurate a measure of gender-inequality-adjusted human development GDI really is. Several of 
the critiques that follow are new to the literature, notably, a detailed accounting of data 
assumptions used in calculating GDI, and demonstrations of the existence of three biases 
stemming from: an inconsistent use of income caps; a hidden penalty resulting from a reversal in 
the order of operations; and a gender mortality bias introduced through the female and male 
population shares. Other topics addressed in this section are restatements of critiques received 
from the literature that I have illustrated using original techniques and the most recent UNDP 
data. Both original and received critiques have been included to provide a comprehensive 
treatment of GDI, its strengths, and its weaknesses.  
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 Assessing data quality 
Any index is only as accurate as its underlying data. The data used to calculate HDI and GDI are 
much more likely to be available for the two genders combined than for each gender 
individually. In calculating the GDI, HDR 2005 eliminates 37 of the 177 countries for which 
HDI values are available due to lack of gender-specific data and makes a number of assumptions 
in order to either present GDIs for certain countries in the absence of complete data or to smooth 
over the rough spots where the actual data fail to conform to their assumed range.10
A general critique of GDI’s data availability and reliability has been provided by Bardhan and 
Klasen (1999), including questions about the quality of life expectancy data where no official 
registration of birth or death exists, and infant deaths, especially, tend to go unreported. Life 
expectancy is, however, the only component for which there are gendered data for every country 
that is included in GDI. These data are more likely to be available because life expectancy at 
birth is a prediction about the expected life spans of children born in a given year, not a 
measurement of the average age of death of those that have died. 
In addition, the UNDP (2005) makes assumptions about certain countries for which gendered 
data are missing or outside of the assumed range, and, in a few cases, where actual data do exist 
and are within the assumed range. Twenty-four industrialized countries – the top 21 countries by 
HDI rank plus Portugal, the Republic of Korea, and the Czech Republic – are simply assumed by 
the UNDP, in the absence of any reference to available data, to have female and male adult 
literacy rates of 99.0 percent.11  
Female and male adult literacy rates for an additional twelve countries are rounded down from 
their reported rates to 99.0 percent, and for Greece are rounded up to 99.0 percent from 88.3 
percent for females and 94.0 percent for males. Uzbekistan’s male literacy rate is reported to be 
99.6 percent, which is not rounded down in HDR 2005, giving it the highest male literacy rate in 
the world for UNDP purposes. Five more countries have literacy rates that are rounded down to 
99.0 percent for males only. 
In order to calculate the “combined gross school enrollment” used in GDI, the number of 
students enrolled in primary, secondary, and tertiary schools is divided by the number of people 
in each country’s normal age groups for those grades. The presence of students recorded as 
living in a different country from the one in which they attend school, as well as the existence of 
any students older than the normal age of the highest tertiary school grade, can return a 
combined gross school enrollment of greater than 100 percent. The UNDP (2005) has chosen to 
round these numbers down to 100 percent for the purposes of calculating GDI. Enrollment rates 
                                                 
10 Five countries are eliminated for lack of gendered life expectancy data, fifteen for lack of adult literacy rates by 
gender (including ten countries not previously excluded for lack of life expectancy data), thirteen for lack of 
gendered enrollment data (including ten countries not previous excluded for lack of data described above), and 
twenty-three for lack of data necessary to calculate estimated earned income (twelve of which were not previously 
excluded for missing life expectancy or education data). 
11 Of these 24 countries, the UNDP (2005) reports literacy rates for the whole population (women and men 
combined) in only four countries: Italy (98.5 percent), Spain (97.7 percent), Portugal (92.5 percent), and the 
Republic of Korea (97.9 percent). 
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are rounded down for men in five and women in nine countries, all of which are classified as by 
the UNDP as high human development. Actual enrollment rates, before rounding down are as 
high as 133 percent for females in the United Kingdom and 114 percent for males in Australia. 
Finally, the data used by the UNDP to estimate gender-specific incomes are not in fact available 
for many countries. HDR 2005 (UNDP 2005: 346) does not make explicit the extent of the 
assumptions used for missing data points in calculating estimated earned income, but notes that, 
“Where data on the wage ratio are not available, a value of 75% is used.” HDR 1995 stated that 
the ratio of female to male non-agricultural wages was only available for 55 out of 130 countries, 
and that the average ratio for these 55 countries – 75 percent – was applied to the remaining 
countries. In HDR 2005, data for the wage ratio and the shares of the economically active 
population by gender are cited as coming from the ILO’s LABORSTA database for 2005 and 
2002, respectively. Examination of the publicly-available LABORSTA data for those years, 
however, showed only nine countries with data for wage ratios and 69 with data for the share of 
economically active population by gender. In the nine countries for which data was available, 
wage ratios ranged from 0.50 in Japan to 0.86 in New Zealand.12
In their review of GDI as a prelude to the construction of an African-GDI on behalf of Economic 
Commission for Africa, Charmes and Wieringa (2003: 428) question the use of international data 
sets in GDI, stating, “Nobody will contest that the most detailed and recent data are available at 
the national level, because their gathering and entry into an international database takes time and 
requires full examination and possibly adaptation.” They suggest that GDI would be more 
accurate if it were calculated at the national level. 
For the data on which GDI is based, what Charmes and Wieringa refer to as the “adaptation” of 
data is pervasive. Without these data adaptations, of course, GDI could only be presented for a 
small subset of countries. Comparing GDI values for a large set of countries provides valuable 
information, but when data adjustments assume optimistically high values in developed countries 
in the absence of data or assume values based on elaborate calculations and very little data, the 
HDRs should provide detailed explanations justifying these choices. 
 
Choosing the right components 
Just because life expectancy, literacy, school enrollment, and income are used to measure well-
being in the HDI does not mean than the gender gaps in these variables are necessarily the best 
data for illuminating the overall disparity in human development between women and men. 
Choosing which components to include, and which to exclude, in any measure of human well-
being, requires a delicate balance of political, practical, and even ethical concerns. Several 
critiques of GDI have pointed out ways in which its data could be improved, including by 
starting over to redesign it from scratch: 
Had the UNDP attempted an independent formulation of the GDI, deriving its framework from 
the experience of developing countries, it could not but have taken note of indicators such as 
                                                 
12 For a discussion of the disparate definitions of labor force participation and earnings used within and between 
countries see Prabhu et al. (1996). 
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access to fuel and water, property rights, incidents of violence against women, etc. While an 
index cannot be expected to capture adequately the subtle yet all pervading discrimination 
against women in various spheres, the UNDP’s effort would have been more meaningful had it 
attempted constructing a comprehensive index that is sensitive to the special problems faced by 
women in developing countries.  (Prabhu et al. 1996: 72) 
Bardhan and Klasen (2000: 194) make a similar argument about constructing a GDI in a way that 
would highlight gender inequality in rich countries. They suggest that variables such as gender 
bias in education choices, the quality of education, and access to employment, training, job 
advancement, or leisure time would better demonstrate a more “subtle” form of gender 
inequality. 
With regard to GDI’s measures of life expectancy and education, Bardhan and Klasen (1999: 
991-993) argue for the inclusion of both “stock” and “flow” measures to balance the effects of 
past and present discrimination against women (where “stock” measures are interpreted as those 
that capture elements of past discrimination), and they point out that while GDI’s education 
component includes the stock measure of adult literacy as well as the “flow” measure of school 
enrollment, life expectancy only measures current, and projected future, discrimination (see also 
Dijkstra and Hanmer 2000: 50, 57).13 According to Bardhan and Klasen (1999: 1003 n.13), GDI 
ignores biases in past gender mortality, where the impact could only be observed in cohorts older 
than the one born in the current year. They suggest that it may be “ethically dubious not to 
consider victims of discrimination simply because they have died as a result of this 
discrimination,” a point to which I return below. Also absent from GDI’s life expectancy 
measure is the impact of pre-natal discrimination (i.e., sex-selective abortion) (Klasen 2006: 
248).14
Many critiques of GDI, including those related to data appropriateness, focus a substantial share 
of their attention on the EDY and GDI’s procedure for estimating gendered income. These 
concerns are addressed in greater detail in the following two sections.  
 
Measuring gendered income 
Unlike the other components in GDI, gendered income is a rough estimate. Several critiques 
have questioned the appropriateness of using non-agricultural wages together with labor force 
participation as gender weights for GDP per capita.15 The ratio of female to male non-
agricultural wages approximates the ratio of all female to male wages only if agricultural and 
non-agricultural wages are similar and the informal sector (where wages are not recorded) is very 
small. The ratio of female to male labor force participation approximates the ratio of female to 
male paid hours worked only if women and men have the same average number of paid hours of 
                                                 
13 The HDR uses life expectancy data from the UN’s World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population 
Database, which defines life expectancy at birth as “the average number of years of life expected by a hypothetical 
[5-year] cohort of individuals who would be subject during all their lives to the mortality rates of a given period.” 
14 For other, more general discussions of which variables to include when measuring women’s well-being see 
Robeyns (2003), Austen et al. (2003), and Charmes and Wieringa (2003). 
15 See Bardhan and Klasen (1999, 2000); Charmes and Wiering (2003); Dijkstra (2002, 2006); Dijkstra and Hanmer 
(2000); Klasen (2006); and Prabhu et al. (1996). 
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work. These two ratios multiplied together approximate the ratio of female to male income only 
if there are no non-wage sources of income – no home production, and no investment or rental 
income. 
Applying the resulting female or male shares of income to GDP divided by the female or male 
population (the UNDP’s formula for estimated earned income) approximates women and men’s 
standard of living only if there are no non-market goods or services, public goods are equally 
distributed with respect to gender, women and men live separately (or with no shared income), 
children are wards of the state, and women and men enjoy equal amounts of leisure time, or if 
gender-specific effects in these arenas mirror the calculated earned income shares. The problem 
of disaggregating household income in such a way as to make a meaningful proxy for material 
well-being by gender is not well-suited to the kinds of broadly available data sets found in the 
HDRs.16 To the extent that women and men have claims on other sources of income and wealth, 
neither the level of consumption nor the standard of living can be inferred from estimated 
gendered income alone. Women and men’s relative contributions to household and children’s 
expenses are another important consideration, as is the direct impact of household labor on living 
standards (Bardhan and Klasen 1999: 992-993). 
One suggestion for improving the income component of GDI is to replace gendered “estimated 
earned income” with some other relevant measure. For example, the UNDP’s Human Poverty 
Index for developing countries (HPI-1) measures deprivation in living standards as the 
percentage of the population without sustainable access to an improved water source and the 
percentage of children under-weight for their age; the HPI-2 (for industrialized countries) uses 
the percentage of people living below the poverty line. Data that are not currently available for 
many countries – but perhaps could be made available with encouragement and funding from the 
UNDP and other international institutions – might better distinguish female from male material 
well-being, like the percentage of under-weight children by gender, or the percentage of people 
living in poverty by gender. 
 
Discounting gendered income 
In the field of economics, income is commonly assumed to have a diminishing marginal utility, 
that is, the more you have, the less each new dollar means to you. In the EDY, as in the HDI’s 
income component, estimated earned income is capped at $40,000 and then discounted by taking 
its natural logarithm (so that a doubling of income has the same effect on GDI regardless of the 
level of income). Both the application of the income cap and the discounting procedure present 
special problems in GDI. In addition, the average gender-inequality penalty to the income 
component is larger than that of life expectancy or education, with the result that gender 
disparities in income dominate the total gender-inequality or GDI penalty. 
 
                                                 
16 See also Iversen (2003) on intra-household inequality, Cantillon and Nolan (2001) on poverty within households, 
and Folbre (2006) on including the care economy in measures of human development. 
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Inconsistent income cap 
Five countries have male estimated earned incomes over $40,000 (female income is below 
$40,000 in all countries included in GDI). Only one of these five, Luxembourg, is actually 
capped at $40,000; the other four – Austria, Ireland, Norway, and the United States – are not 
capped, resulting in Male Income Indices greater than 1.000.17 Ignoring the $40,000 income cap 
in countries where estimated male income is greater than $40,000 maintains the greatest 
consistency with HDI. Applying the income cap (as the GDI formula dictates) in countries, like 
Luxembourg, where both GDP per capita and estimated male income exceed $40,000, however, 
both fails to maintain consistency with HDI18 and artificially shrinks the gap between female and 
male income, thereby decreasing the gender-inequality penalty. 
A method that maintains some consistency with HDI without shrinking gender gaps in income is 
to use $40,000 minus one-half the gender gap to calculate the female income index and $40,000 
plus one-half the gender gap for the male income index. In this way, both Luxembourg’s mean 
income level as assumed in HDI, $40,000, and the size of the gap between female and male 
income, $54,993, are considered in the calculation of GDI. The effect would be to reduce 
Luxembourg’s GDI from 0.944 to 0.923, and its GDI rank from seventh to twentieth, below 
Germany and above Spain. While this problem is currently limited to one country’s GDI, several 
other countries’ GDP per capitas are rapidly approaching $40,000.  
 
Hidden penalty 
A second concern is with GDI’s adjustment for the diminishing marginal utility of income. 
Unaccounted for interactions exist between the discounting effect and the gender-inequality 
penalty effect. The UNDP (2005: 344) states that when ε is set equal to zero, GDI reverts to HDI. 
But in fact, HDI is not equal to GDI with ε = 0 (hereafter referred to as the Weighted-HDI).19  
Table 2 divides the total GDI penalty (or the difference between HDI and GDI) into two steps: 
the difference between HDI and Weighted-HDI, and the difference between Weighted-HDI and 
GDI. With three components and two steps, there are six possible sources of differences that 
together make up the total GDI penalty.20 If HDI and Weighted-HDI were equal, then 100 
percent of the penalty would come from the difference between Weighted-HDI and GDI.21 
Instead, 45 percent of the penalty is the result of differences between HDI and Weighted-HDI, 
and nearly all of this disparity stems from the income component. 
                                                 
17 This exception to the GDI formula is not explained in the HDRs (UNDP 2005). 
18 Using this method, when ε = 0, Luxembourg’s Equally Distributed Income Index would be much small than its 
income index in HDI. 
19 Weighted-HDI is GDI with ε = 0, which, according to the UNDP (2005), is equal to the HDI, or more accurately, 
the HDI weighted by the female and male population shares. The population shares should be implicit in each of the 
HDI components. 
20 Note that each of the six sub-penalties is divided by three before being combined to form the total penalty. 
21 If Penalty = HDI – GDI(ε = 2) and HDI = GDI(ε = 0), then Penalty should = GDI(ε = 0) – GDI(ε = 2). Instead, Penalty = 
(HDI – GDI(ε = 0)) + (GDI(ε = 0) – GDI(ε = 2)). 
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Health Education Income Total Penalty
0.000 0.000 0.011 0.004
-1.4% -1.0% 47.8% 45.3%
Health Education Income Total Penalty
0.001 0.005 0.006 0.004
5.1% 22.7% 26.9% 54.7%
Health Education Income Total Penalty
0.001 0.005 0.017 0.008
3.6% 21.7% 74.7% 100.0%
Table 2: Average share of penalty by component (2003)
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.
HDI less Weighted HDI
Weighted HDI less GDI
HDI less GDI
 
In the regular income index used to calculate HDI, GDP per capita is, in effect, the average of 
female and male incomes weighted by gendered population shares. The order of operations used 
to calculate the income component in HDI is, therefore, first a weighted average, then a log 
transformation for discounting, then normalization. In GDI and Weighted-HDI, however, the 
order of operations is first log transformation, then normalization, then weighted average. This is 
of concern because the natural log of a weighted average is not equal to the weighted average of 
a natural log.22 (For a demonstration of this effect see Appendix C). 
In Tables 3 and 4 below, all three indices have had their orders of calculation reshuffled to more 
closely approximate HDI. For EDH and EDE, a harmonic mean, weighted by the female and 
male populations shares, is taken of the values themselves (for Weighted-HDI this becomes the 
weighted arithmetic mean). These penalized values are then normalized using the regular ranges 
or goalposts.23 For EDE, the weighted harmonic mean of both literacy and enrollment is taken 
before normalization; then the two components are averaged using the normal two to one 
weighting. For EDY, first the weighted harmonic mean is take of female and male income, then 
the penalized income is discounted and the normalization formula is applied.  
Using this new order of operations, Weighted-HDI is much closer in value to HDI, and the gap 
between HDI and GDI has gotten slightly larger (compare Table 4 to Table 2). EDH is the only 
                                                 
22 From 1995 to 1998, GDI was calculated using a different discounting method, which was applied after the 
weighting and penalty procedure. In HDR 1999, GDI was changed in both the discounting method and the order of 
operations to the current formula. The latter change was prompted by Bardhan and Klasen’s (1999) argument that 
applying the penalty before discounting resulted in disproportionately higher penalties for richer countries (993). 
Dijkstra (2002, 2006) has argued that Bardhan and Klasen’s critique was incorrect and that discounting before 
applying the penalty in effect discounts the gaps as well as the values, thereby reducing the overall penalty (308-
309). 
23 Except in EDH, where female life expectancy has five years subtracted from it and the male goalposts, 22.5 and 
82.5, are used; for Weighted-HDI, five years is not subtracted and the goalposts are the regular 25 and 85. 
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component where HDI still diverges from Weighted-HDI after the change in order of operations. 
This result is a good example of how small the numerical differences are between HDI and GDI. 
Life expectancy as reported in the HDR 2005 and life expectancy calculated in the recalculated 
Weighted-HDI are the same to the tenth of a year in almost all cases, and that is all the 
significant figures that really exist here.   
Health Education Income Total Penalty
-0.001 0.000 0.000 0.000
-2.4% -0.8% 0.8% -2.4%
Health Education Income Total Penalty
0.001 0.006 0.022 0.010
3.3% 21.3% 77.8% 102.4%
Health Education Income Total Penalty
0.000 0.006 0.022 0.009
0.9% 20.5% 78.6% 100.0%
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.
HDI less GDI
Table 3: Share of penalty by component after adjustment of calculation order (2003)
HDI less Weighted HDI
Weighted HDI less GDI
 
Table 4: Adjusted GDI with re-ordering of calculations (2003), selected countries
GDI rank Country GDI adj- GDI Change in GDI Change in rank
41 Bahrain 0.836 0.830 0.006 -2
61 Oman 0.758 0.748 0.010 -3
65 Saudi Arabia 0.749 0.740 0.009 -3
76 Belize 0.734 0.728 0.006 0
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
Table 4 shows the results of adjusting GDI by reordering the calculations for selected countries. 
The resulting adjusted-GDI is, on average, smaller by 0.002, although 30 countries stay the same 
and six become slightly larger. The largest deductions are for Oman (0.010), Saudi Arabia 
(0.009), Bahrain (0.006), and Belize (0.006). The effect of this adjustment on GDI ranks is far 
less dramatic, since almost all GDI values change in the same direction.  
 
Imbalanced penalties 
GDI’s three component indices are combined together in a simple, unweighted average. On the 
surface this implies a balance of importance among the health, education, and income gender-
inequality penalties, but implicit weights may exist if the mean or variance of the component 
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female to male gaps are imbalanced (Dijkstra 2002: 313). As shown in Table 2 above, the total 
gender-inequality penalty, or the difference between HDI and GDI, is 0.008, of which life 
expectancy accounts for 3.6 percent, education 21.7 percent, and income 74.7 percent.24  
Bardhan and Klasen (1999: 990) used the same basic method to critique the uneven implicit 
weights given to life expectancy, education, and income in the overall GDI penalty using data 
from HDR 1995: “While the aim and underlying premise of the GDI (to see gender inequality as 
a human development issue and not primarily a ‘women’s issue’) is to be welcomed, it appears 
that the current version of GDI is largely driven by gaps in one component, the earned-income 
component.” In their study, the percentage of the total penalty that was accounted for by each 
term was: 1.0% health; 14.0% education; and 85.0% income. According to Bardhan and Klasen, 
this bias in GDI resulted in the assignment of higher penalties to countries whose gender 
inequality stemmed from income disparities – in the Middle East and North Africa – and lower 
penalties to countries whose gender inequality stemmed from disparities in life expectancy or 
education – Southeast Asia, Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, and Russia (1999: 989-994; 
2000: 194). 
While the imbalance is somewhat smaller in the more recent data, income continues to drown out 
the effects of gender disparities in life expectancy and education. Dijkstra (2006) and Klasen 
(2006) suggest standardizing all three components (which would have the unfortunate effect of 
making the GDI no longer comparable across years), choosing a higher ε for the life expectancy 
component, or increasing the minimum life expectancy value by ten years in the normalization 
formula. Raising the minimum life expectancy by just two and one-half years (to 30 years for 
women and 25 years for men) does increase the share of the GDI penalty attributable to gender 
disparities in life expectancy (see Table 5), but limits the comparability between HDI and GDI. 
Health Education Income Total Penalty
0.015 0.005 0.017 0.013
40.6% 13.4% 46.1% 100.0%
HDI less GDI
Table 5: Adjusted average share of penalty by component (2003)
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
 
Valuing gender inequality 
The value assigned to the parameter ε is meant to result in GDI penalties that are of a size that 
seems consistent with gender inequality’s negative impact on well-being in each country. When 
the UNDP (1995: 73) first introduced the GDI in 1995, it described ε as an “adjustable” 
parameter: 
                                                 
24 See also Klasen (2006); note that Klasen is measuring the gender penalty as the difference between the Weighted-
HDI and the GDI, whereas here the penalty is the difference between the HDI and GDI. 
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[E]ach society can choose a specific value for its “aversion to gender inequality” (ε), depending 
on where it starts and what goals it wants to achieve over what time period. In previous [HDRs], 
ε was implicitly assumed to be zero – that is, no policy preference for gender equality was 
adopted. But policy-makers must make an explicit choice of the weight they wish to assign to their 
preference for gender equality…The illustrative calculations of the GDI…are based on ε = 2 
(harmonic mean), which expresses a moderate degree of inequality aversion. This is only to show 
that, even with modest weights, the profile of gender inequality looks fairly bad in most countries. 
The suggestion that policy-makers should first assign their own level of aversion to gender 
inequality and then recalculate the GDI before comparing various countries’ GDIs to their own 
or evaluating their own country’s progress in GDI seems somewhat unrealistic. An argument 
could be made that policy-makers in some countries seem to have little or no aversion to gender 
inequality, and that some actively seek to perpetuate gender disparities. The adjustable quality is 
no longer mentioned in more recent HDRs, leaving ε = 2 as the de facto value. The Equally 
Distributed Index formula, therefore, can be restated in a more transparent form:  
  1  
FemalePopSharei MalePopSharei(22) ED-Indexi =
Female-Indexi
+ Male-Indexi
 
 
The average penalty assigned for gender inequality in calculating GDI is just 0.008 (compared to 
HDI’s range of 0.963 to 0.281). The loss of 0.008 of HDI is comparable to one of any of the 
following: 1.5 fewer years of average life expectancy; 3.5 fewer percentage points in the literacy 
rate; or 7.0 fewer percentage points in the school enrollment rate. Because of the adjustment for 
diminishing marginal returns, an equivalent reduction in GDP per capita would depend on the 
income level, for example, either from $40,000 to $34,500 or from $10,000 to $8,700. 
The largest penalty – 0.040 for Yemen – is just a little bit larger than the size of the difference 
between the HDIs of Norway (ranked first by HDI) and Spain (ranked twenty-first).25 Using the 
language of the HDRs, if society placed the “moderate” value on gender inequality assumed in 
GDI, then the decrease in Yemen’s human development due to gender inequality – a country 
where on average women live less than three years longer than men (compared to the “normal” 5 
years), 29 percent of women can read compared to 70 percent of men, 41 percent of young 
women are enrolled in school compared to 69 percent of men, and the average woman earns 
$400 a year compared to $1300 for men – would have the same impact on well-being as the 
choice of living in Spain instead of Norway. 
GDI penalties range from zero percent of HDI in nine countries to 8.2 percent in Yemen, with an 
average penalty of 1.3 percent. Is this a “moderate” degree of inequality aversion? And if it is, 
can the amount that society’s well-being suffers as a result of gender inequality accurately be 
described as “moderate”? Table 6 below compares countries’ ranks for Weighted-HDI (ε = 0), 
GDI (ε = 2), GDI with ε = 10, and GDI with ε = 100 for the ten countries with the lowest ranks  
                                                 
25 Throughout this chapter, HDI ranks have been recalculated to exclude 37 countries left out of GDI for lack of 
gendered data. 
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Table 6: Rankings of GDIs with higher penalty factors (2003), selected countries
Rank Weighted HDI GDI GDI ε = 10 GDI ε = 100
131 Congo, D.R. Congo, D.R. Burundi Zambia
132 Mozambique Burundi Congo, D.R. Congo, D.R.
133 Burundi Mozambique Mozambique Mozambique
134 Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia
135 Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Mali Mali
136 Chad Mali Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
137 Mali Chad Chad Chad
138 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau
139 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Niger Sierra Leone
140 Niger Niger Sierra Leone Niger
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
by each of these measures. (For results for all 140 countries see Appendix D). The average 
penalty for GDI with ε = 10 is 3.5 percent and for GDI with ε = 100 is 6.2 percent. For Yemen, 
the GDI penalty reaches 18.3 percent with ε = 10 and 22.0 percent with ε = 100.  
In past HDRs, the UNDP has referred to gender inequality as a “persistent neglect to the 
creativity and productivity of half of humanity,” (1995: 23) and has stated that, “Of the many 
inequalities in human development, the most striking is that along gender lines.” (1991: 92) The 
best value for ε is, of course, subjective, but an ε value larger than that currently used in GDI – 
and an average penalty for gender inequality larger than one percent of HDI – would seem better 
aligned with the size of the burden of gender inequality portrayed in the HDRs.26
 
Regarding the direction of penalties 
Any difference between female and male component indices – regardless of its direction – is 
penalized by a reduction in the Equally Distributed Index formula. This is to say that, even when 
the female index is higher than the male index, a penalty will nonetheless be assessed.27 This 
gender-blind feature of GDI does not appear to have been the intention of UNDP (1995: 73) in 
electing to use this particular measure of human development, as evidenced by this description of 
what value GDI takes as ε approaches infinity: “In the extreme case, if ε = infinity, only 
achievements of women get a positive weight, and the relative achievements of men are 
ignored.” This, of course, could be true only if female indices were exclusively lower than male 
indices. 
                                                 
26 Other critiques of the UNDP’s choice of values for ε in GDI include Bardhan and Klasen 1999, and Dijkstra and 
Hanmer 2000. For further discussion on the choice of ε in this type of welfare measure see Grün and Klasen (2003). 
27 See Dijkstra (2002); Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000); Klasen (2006);and UNDP (1995: 74). 
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To be clear, a female advantage in one component does not offset a male advantage in another. 
Instead, any gender inequality – regardless of direction – adds to the GDI penalty.28 This renders 
the meaning of GDI somewhat difficult to interpret. The idea that male disadvantages are added 
on top of female disadvantages to sum up to a final gender inequality penalty is complex and 
counter-intuitive. It seems at odds both with what someone who has not read the technical notes 
to the HDR is likely to assume “gender inequality” means and with the UNDP’s own rhetoric, in 
which the terms “gender inequality” and men’s advantages over women are used 
interchangeably.29
For 2003, 77 out of 140 countries have at least one component in which the female index is 
higher than the male index (see Appendix Table E). When female and male component indices 
are used independently to calculate Female-HDIs and Male-HDIs, seven countries have higher 
Female than Male-HDIs: Luxembourg and six former Soviet Republics.30 The meaning of the 
resulting GDI penalty, and of GDI itself, is unclear – especially in countries in which females are 
better off than males by some component indices but worse off by others. Table 7 is a correlation 
matrix for the gender-inequality penalties associated with the health, education, and income 
components; correlation between the three component penalties is low, and two of the three 
pairwise correlations are negative. 
Table 7: Correlation matrix of component penalties (2003)
H penalty E penalty Y penalty
H penalty 1.000
E penalty 0.028 1.000
Y penalty -0.240 -0.197 1.000
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data  
 
Rewarding gender mortality bias 
Each Equally Distributed Index is weighted by the female and male population shares. The 
inclusion of unequal population shares in the ED formulas introduces a bias (not unlike a 
perverse incentive) for low female to male sex ratios, where a low female share of the population 
gives a correspondingly low weight to women’s lower index values, thereby underestimating 
gender disparities.31 In addition, when males have the lower index values, the low female 
population share result in a greater emphasis on male disadvantages. (For a demonstration of 
these effects see Appendix F.)  
This bias could be called the “missing women” effect after Amartya Sen’s (1990) observations 
about gender mortality bias. Missing women are the additional women and girls who, but for the 
existence of past and present gender mortality bias, would be alive today. Sen used the sex ratio 
                                                 
28 A technical note to HDR 1995 (UNDP 1995: 131) recognizes this issue, but concludes that it is not an important 
concern because it occurs in very few countries and those countries are at the highest levels of human development. 
29 See Schüler (2006) on misinterpretations of GDI in scholarly articles as well as UNDP reports. 
30 For further discussion of this topic see Klasen (2006). 
31 See also Kanbur and Mukherjee (2003) and Klasen (2006). 
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in Sub-Saharan African, 102 females for every 100 males (or a female population share of 
0.505), as the sex ratio that would be expected under conditions of low gender mortality bias. 
Comparing this expected sex ratio to the actual sex ratios in other regions, he found a deficit of 
11 percent. One hundred million of the women that would be expected in South Asia, West Asia, 
China, and North Africa were missing. All of the countries with missing women are rewarded in 
terms of their GDI value whenever the remaining women are disadvantaged in health, education, 
or income. 
If Sen’s expected gender population shares are used in the calculation of GDI in place of each 
country’s actual population shares, nine countries’ GDIs increase by 0.001 and 95 countries’ 
GDIs stay constant. The remaining 36 countries have lower GDIs using Sen’s population shares; 
the change in GDI after this adjustment is the size of the bonus given to these countries’ GDIs 
for gender mortality bias. The countries that receive the highest missing women bonuses are 
shown in Table 8 below. 
GDI 
rank Country
Female share of 
population GDI
adjusted-
GDI
GDI less 
adjusted-GDI
GDI rank less 
adjusted-GDI rank
39 Kuwait 0.400 0.843 0.837 0.006 -1
41 Bahrain 0.430 0.836 0.830 0.007 -2
61 Oman 0.438 0.758 0.749 0.009 -3
65 Saudi Arabia 0.460 0.749 0.743 0.006 -3
73 Jordan 0.480 0.740 0.737 0.002 -1
98 India 0.487 0.587 0.585 0.002 0
103 Papua New Guinea 0.484 0.518 0.516 0.002 0
107 Pakistan 0.485 0.508 0.505 0.003 -1
121 Yemen 0.493 0.449 0.447 0.002 -1
128 Côte d'Ivoire 0.492 0.403 0.401 0.002 0
Table 8: Adjusted GDI with Sen's population shares (2003), selected countries
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data  
 
Identifying the differences from HDI 
After the data are chosen, gendered income is estimated, penalties are assigned, and components 
are averaged together, the resulting GDI should be different from HDI – a difference that is 
meant to represent the extent of loss of well-being due to gender inequality in each country. 
Figure 1 is a scatterplot of GDI penalties versus HDI values using 2003 data. Most GDI penalties 
are very small, which suggests that GDI values are dominated by the information in HDI; that is, 
the new information meant to differentiate GDI, and to emphasize the impact of gender 
inequality on all human well-being, is being overshadowed by the rest of the HDI. In thirteen 
countries the difference between HDI and GDI is less than one one-thousandth, and therefore not 
appreciable in the three significant figures in this data; in a further 22 countries, the GDI penalty 
is 0.001. 
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 Figure 1: GDI Penalties versus HDI (2003) 
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Source: HDR 2005 and author’s calculations using HDR 2005 data. 
 
Figure 2: Histogram of Rank Differences (HDI rank less GDI rank) (2003) 
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Source: Author’s calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
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When GDI ranks are compared to HDI ranks, the largest changes in rank are for Sri Lanka (GDI 
is 7 ranks higher than HDI); Guyana (4 ranks higher); Belize, Oman, Peru, and Saudi Arabia (5 
ranks lower); and Ireland, Lebanon, Pakistan, Paraguay, and Yemen (4 ranks lower). For 46 out 
of the 140 countries, there is no change in rank (see Figure 2 above), and for 51 the difference is 
only one rank up or down.  
GDI has a noticeable effect on HDI ranks, but very little impact on HDI values. One can only 
hope that society’s aversion to gender inequality is greater than that represented by the penalty to 
GDI.  
 
Simplifying the GDI 
In introducing the GDI, HDR 1995 (UNDP 1995: 72) emphasized its practical use to policy-
makers, stating: 
[GDI is] suggested to capture gender disparities and their adverse effects on social progress. 
Capturing such a complex reality in a single, simple index is not easy. But a beginning must be 
made, however limited, to place the problem of gender inequality firmly on the social agenda. 
For policy-makers particularly, it is useful to look at composite measures – for their own 
countries and for others – to draw policy conclusions about critical shortfalls in gender 
capabilities or opportunities, and about priorities to consider in their plans of action. 
A clear preference for a clearer, simpler, more straightforward measure has been expressed in 
several critiques of the GDI.32 Charmes and Wieringa (2003: 429-30), in the context of creating 
an African-GDI, state that, “The complexity of this measure of calculation, coupled with the fact 
that its computation is based on international data sets, effectively means that the control of the 
data is out of reach of many NGOs in developing countries.” Likewise, Dijkstra and Hanmer 
(2000: 45) remark that, “[W]hether ε is set equal to infinity, one, or two, none of the resulting 
measures translates readily into an indicator of the position of women which can be easily used 
and understood by nonspecialists and policy-makers.” More recently, Schüler (2006) describes 
how GDI has often been mistaken for a measure of gender inequality in academic articles and 
even in UNDP reports. 
GDI is not computationally simple; its calculation is clearly more complicated than HDI, 
requiring several extra steps and the use of exponents in a penalty formula the effect of which is 
far from transparent. Neither is GDI conceptually simple; the meaning of an index that adds male 
penalties to female penalties to result in a gender inequality penalty is obscure. Finally, GDI’s 
use or interpretation is not simple; GDI values are very nearly the same as HDI values. What 
interpretation can these small differences be given with regards to the state of countries’ gender-
inequality-adjusted well-being, except that disparities between women and men have little or no 
effect on human development? 
 
                                                 
32 See Bardhan and Klasen (1999); Charmes and Wieringa (2003); Dijkstra (2006); Dijkstra and Hanmer (2000); 
Klasen (2006); and Schüler (2006). 
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Conclusions 
GDI is a valuable, but flawed, tool. This chapter has endeavored to critically examine GDI’s 
shortcomings in its role as a measure of human development penalized for the extent of gender 
inequality. The main critiques set out here may be summarized as: 
• GDI’s underlying data suffer from numerous deficiencies in data availability that have 
made necessary numerous assumptions in place of actual data values. For most of the 
source data, these assumed data values are the exception, but in the case of the data used 
to estimate female and male earned incomes, it may be that more data are assumed than 
measured. 
• Life expectancy, literacy, school enrollment, and income may not be the best collection 
of capabilities with which to observe gender disparities. Other possible components that 
might be more appropriate to the task include: access to fuel and water; property rights; 
incidents of violence against women; gender bias in education choices; the quality of 
education; access to employment, training, and job advancement; and access to leisure 
time. 
• The method used to estimate female and male earned incomes ignores: the existence of 
self-employment; biases in women and men’s access to full-time paid work; and the 
complex nature of intrahousehold distribution of money, goods, and labor.  
• The diminishing marginal utility of income is represented in GDI by a cap on income at 
$40,000 that is applied to one country, but not to others, and by taking the natural 
logarithm of income. The log of income is taken before the gender inequality penalty is 
calculated, whereas in HDI taking the log comes in the final step. This difference in the 
order of operations between HDI and GDI creates a hidden and unintended penalty to 
GDI. 
• Life expectancy, education, and income do not make up equal shares of the value of GDI. 
Instead, gender disparities in income dominate the GDI penalty. 
• In the calculation of GDI, society is assumed to have an aversion to inequality that is 
equal, on average, to one percent of the value of HDI. This implicit assessment of gender 
inequality’s significance to human well-being seems out of step with the UNDP’s own 
rhetoric regarding the enormous impact of disparities between women and men. 
• Female and male disadvantages in capabilities are treated identically in GDI, so that 
penalties for female deprivations are added to penalties for male deprivations to form a 
final gender inequality penalty. The meaning of gender inequality in this sense is difficult 
to understand, and cannot be at all obvious to the casual user of GDI. 
• GDI contains a “missing women,” or gender mortality bias. The fewer women in a given 
country, the less the deprivation of those remaining women counts in GDI’s method of 
measuring human development. 
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• While GDI ranks differ from those of HDI, GDI values are very nearly the same as HDI 
values. A measure of human development adjusted for gender inequality that is barely 
distinguishable from a measure of human development that is neutral to gender 
inequality seems deeply flawed. 
• GDI requires a specialist to calculate and interpret it. A simpler, more straightforward 
measure would be preferable for the purposes of policy-makers and development 
professionals. 
 
Several of these critiques are new contributions to the human development literature: the detailed 
accounting of data assumptions used in calculating GDI, and the demonstrations of the 
inconsistent use of income caps, the hidden penalty resulting from a reversal in the order of 
operations, and the gender mortality bias introduced through the female and male population 
shares. 
A measure of human well-being that takes gender inequality into account is an essential element 
of the portrait of human development contained in the HDRs. Klasen (2006: 260) concludes a 
recent critique of GDI saying: 
I believe it is not useful to continue reporting the GDI as the main indicator for gender-related 
human development. It is frequently misunderstood and it is beset with serious conceptual and 
empirical problems. At the same time, it would be useful to re-consider a revised GDI within a 
range of distribution-sensitive HDIs. 
Like Klasen, I believe that GDI is seriously flawed in its current formulation, and that it should 
be replaced by an improved or corrected GDI.  
The following steps are recommended towards improving the resolution of gender inequality in 
the HDRs. First, GDI’s Equally Distributed Index formula should be changed, and several 
suggestions for doing so have been described in this chapter. Second, GDI should be 
supplemented by measures of gender inequality, and women’s and men’s level of development 
to give a more complete picture of human development. Finally, these new formulas should be 
reported in the HDR and evaluated both by academics and by development professionals for 
clarity and usefulness as tools for demonstrating the existence of, observing changes in, and 
finally disassembling systems of gender disparities in human development. The next chapter of 
this dissertation addresses both complements and alternatives to the current GDI, including 
modifications to improve its quality. 
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 Appendix A: Data 
Country F M F M F M F M F M
1 Norway 0.503 0.497 81.9 76.8 99.0 99.0 100 97 $32,272 $43,148
2 Australia 0.506 0.494 82.8 77.7 99.0 99.0 100 100 $24,827 $34,446
3 Iceland 0.500 0.500 82.6 78.7 99.0 99.0 100 91 $25,411 $36,908
4 Sweden 0.504 0.496 82.4 77.9 99.0 99.0 100 100 $21,842 $31,722
5 Canada 0.504 0.496 82.4 77.4 99.0 99.0 96 92 $23,922 $37,572
6 Switzerland 0.516 0.484 83.2 77.6 99.0 99.0 88 92 $28,972 $32,149
7 Luxembourg 0.507 0.493 81.5 75.2 99.0 99.0 89 88 $34,890 $40,000
8 United States 0.508 0.492 80.0 74.6 99.0 99.0 97 89 $29,017 $46,456
9 Belgium 0.509 0.491 82.0 75.7 99.0 99.0 100 100 $19,951 $37,019
10 Finland 0.510 0.490 81.7 75.1 99.0 99.0 100 100 $23,211 $32,250
11 Netherlands 0.504 0.496 81.1 75.7 99.0 99.0 99 99 $20,512 $38,389
12 Ireland 0.503 0.497 80.3 75.1 99.0 99.0 97 89 $22,125 $53,549
13 Denmark 0.505 0.495 79.4 74.8 99.0 99.0 100 97 $26,587 $36,430
14 Japan 0.512 0.488 85.4 78.4 99.0 99.0 83 85 $17,795 $38,612
15 United Kingdom 0.512 0.488 80.6 76.0 99.0 99.0 100 100 $20,790 $33,713
16 France 0.513 0.487 83.0 75.9 99.0 99.0 94 90 $20,642 $35,123
17 Italy 0.515 0.485 83.1 76.9 99.0 99.0 89 85 $17,176 $37,670
18 New Zealand 0.509 0.491 81.3 76.8 99.0 99.0 100 94 $18,379 $26,960
19 Austria 0.511 0.489 81.8 76.0 99.0 99.0 90 88 $15,878 $45,174
20 Germany 0.512 0.488 81.5 75.7 99.0 99.0 88 90 $19,534 $36,258
21 Spain 0.509 0.491 83.2 75.9 99.0 99.0 96 91 $13,854 $31,322
22 Israel 0.505 0.495 81.7 77.6 95.6 98.3 93 89 $14,159 $25,969
23 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.524 0.476 84.6 78.7 89.6 96.9 73 74 $19,593 $35,037
24 Greece 0.506 0.494 80.9 75.6 99.0 99.0 93 91 $12,531 $27,591
25 Slovenia 0.512 0.488 80.0 72.7 99.0 99.0 99 92 $14,751 $23,779
26 Portugal 0.517 0.483 80.6 73.9 99.0 99.0 97 90 $12,853 $23,829
27 Korea, Rep. of 0.499 0.501 80.6 73.3 99.0 99.0 87 100 $11,698 $24,167
28 Cyprus 0.514 0.486 81.1 76.1 95.1 98.6 79 78 $11,864 $25,260
29 Barbados 0.517 0.483 78.5 71.4 99.0 99.0 94 84 $11,976 $19,687
30 Czech Republic 0.513 0.487 78.7 72.3 99.0 99.0 81 80 $12,843 $20,051
31 Hungary 0.524 0.476 76.8 68.6 99.0 99.0 92 87 $11,287 $18,183
32 Malta 0.504 0.496 80.8 75.9 89.2 86.4 80 78 $9,893 $25,525
33 Poland 0.515 0.485 78.4 70.3 99.0 99.0 93 88 $8,769 $14,147
34 Argentina 0.511 0.489 78.2 70.7 97.2 97.2 99 91 $6,635 $17,800
35 Estonia 0.540 0.460 77.0 65.6 99.0 99.0 99 87 $10,745 $16,750
36 Lithuania 0.534 0.466 77.8 66.6 99.0 99.0 98 90 $9,595 $14,064
37 Slovakia 0.515 0.485 77.9 70.1 99.0 99.0 76 74 $10,681 $16,463
38 Chile 0.505 0.495 80.9 74.8 95.6 95.8 81 82 $5,753 $14,872
39 Kuwait 0.400 0.600 79.5 75.2 81.0 84.7 85 75 $8,448 $24,204
40 Croatia 0.519 0.481 78.4 71.4 97.1 99.0 76 74 $8,047 $14,351
41 Bahrain 0.430 0.570 75.9 73.1 83.0 92.5 85 77 $7,685 $24,909
42 Uruguay 0.515 0.485 79.0 71.7 98.1 97.3 93 83 $5,763 $10,950
43 Latvia 0.543 0.457 77.0 65.8 99.0 99.0 95 84 $8,050 $12,886
44 Costa Rica 0.492 0.508 80.6 75.9 95.9 95.7 69 67 $5,236 $14,000
45 Bulgaria 0.516 0.484 75.6 68.9 97.7 98.7 78 77 $6,212 $9,334
46 Mexico 0.511 0.489 77.5 72.6 88.7 92.0 76 74 $5,068 $13,506
47 Panama 0.496 0.504 77.4 72.3 91.2 92.5 82 76 $4,597 $9,069
48 Trinidad and Tobago 0.507 0.493 73.0 66.9 97.9 99.0 67 64 $6,792 $14,807
49 Macedonia, TFYR 0.501 0.499 76.3 71.3 94.1 98.2 71 69 $4,861 $8,725
50 Malaysia 0.492 0.508 75.6 70.9 85.4 92.0 73 68 $6,075 $12,869
51 Romania 0.513 0.487 75.0 67.8 96.3 98.4 73 70 $5,391 $9,261
52 Brazil 0.507 0.493 74.6 66.6 88.6 88.3 93 89 $4,704 $10,963
53 Belarus 0.533 0.467 74.0 62.4 99.0 99.0 91 86 $4,842 $7,418
54 Mauritius 0.504 0.496 75.7 68.8 80.5 88.2 71 71 $6,084 $16,606
55 Colombia 0.506 0.494 75.4 69.3 94.6 93.7 72 69 $4,557 $8,892
56 Albania 0.504 0.496 76.7 71.0 98.3 99.0 70 68 $3,266 $5,836
57 Thailand 0.509 0.491 73.8 66.3 90.5 94.9 72 72 $5,784 $9,452
58 Venezuela 0.498 0.502 75.9 70.0 92.7 93.3 76 73 $2,890 $6,929
59 Ukraine 0.541 0.459 72.5 60.1 99.0 99.0 87 84 $3,891 $7,329
60 Kazakhstan 0.521 0.479 69.0 57.8 99.0 99.0 87 83 $5,221 $8,217
61 Oman 0.438 0.562 75.7 72.8 65.4 82.0 63 63 $4,013 $21,614
62 Armenia 0.534 0.466 74.7 68.0 99.0 99.0 74 69 $3,026 $4,352
63 Philippines 0.497 0.503 72.5 68.3 92.7 92.5 83 80 $3,213 $5,409
64 China 0.486 0.514 73.5 69.9 86.5 95.1 68 70 $3,961 $5,976
65 Saudi Arabia 0.460 0.540 73.9 70.1 69.3 87.1 57 58 $4,440 $20,717
66 Sri Lanka 0.492 0.508 76.8 71.5 88.6 92.2 69 67 $2,579 $5,009
67 Peru 0.497 0.503 72.6 67.5 82.1 93.5 88 87 $2,231 $8,256
68 Lebanon 0.510 0.490 74.2 69.8 81.0 92.4 80 77 $2,430 $7,789
69 Tunisia 0.496 0.504 75.4 71.2 65.3 83.4 76 73 $3,840 $10,420
70 Fiji 0.492 0.508 70.1 65.7 91.4 94.5 73 73 $3,146 $8,525
Appendix Table A: Data used in calculating GDI (2003)
Enrollment Earned IncomeHDI 
rank
Population Share Life Expectancy Literacy
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Country F M F M F M F M F M
71 Turkey 0.496 0.504 71.1 66.5 81.1 95.7 62 74 $4,276 $9,286
72 Paraguay 0.496 0.504 73.2 68.7 90.2 93.1 74 73 $2,316 $7,000
73 Jordan 0.480 0.520 72.9 69.9 84.7 95.1 79 77 $2,004 $6,491
74 Dominican Republic 0.495 0.505 71.0 63.9 87.3 88.0 81 71 $3,608 $9,949
75 Jamaica 0.506 0.494 72.5 69.0 91.4 83.8 77 71 $3,279 $4,944
76 Belize 0.495 0.505 74.5 69.5 77.1 76.7 78 76 $2,695 $11,143
77 Azerbaijan 0.515 0.485 70.5 63.2 98.2 99.0 68 71 $2,683 $4,591
78 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.493 0.507 71.9 69.0 70.4 83.5 65 72 $3,094 $10,856
79 Guyana 0.515 0.485 66.1 60.0 98.2 99.0 78 77 $2,426 $6,152
80 El Salvador 0.508 0.492 73.9 67.8 77.1 82.4 67 68 $2,939 $6,689
81 Cape Verde 0.520 0.480 73.2 67.0 68.0 85.4 73 73 $3,392 $7,136
82 Algeria 0.496 0.504 72.4 69.8 60.1 79.5 72 76 $2,896 $9,244
83 Syrian Arab Republic 0.497 0.503 75.1 71.6 74.2 91.0 60 65 $1,584 $5,534
84 Viet Nam 0.501 0.499 72.6 68.6 86.9 93.9 61 67 $2,026 $2,964
85 Kyrgyzstan 0.508 0.492 71.1 62.7 98.1 99.0 83 81 $1,388 $2,128
86 Uzbekistan 0.503 0.497 69.8 63.4 98.9 99.6 74 77 $1,385 $2,099
87 Indonesia 0.501 0.499 68.8 64.9 83.4 92.5 65 67 $2,289 $4,434
88 Nicaragua 0.500 0.500 72.1 67.3 76.6 76.8 71 68 $2,018 $4,512
89 Bolivia 0.502 0.498 66.2 62.0 80.4 92.9 84 90 $1,615 $3,573
90 Mongolia 0.499 0.501 66.1 62.1 97.5 98.0 80 69 $1,478 $2,227
91 Moldova, Rep. of 0.522 0.478 71.3 63.9 95.0 97.5 64 60 $1,200 $1,850
92 South Africa 0.509 0.491 50.2 46.8 80.9 84.1 78 78 $6,505 $14,326
93 Tajikistan 0.504 0.496 66.3 61.0 99.0 99.0 69 82 $854 $1,367
94 Guatemala 0.513 0.487 71.0 63.6 63.3 75.4 59 63 $2,073 $6,197
95 Equatorial Guinea 0.505 0.495 43.9 42.6 76.4 92.1 60 71 $10,771 $27,053
96 Namibia 0.504 0.496 49.0 47.6 83.5 86.8 72 70 $4,201 $8,234
97 Morocco 0.503 0.497 71.9 67.5 38.3 63.3 54 62 $2,299 $5,699
98 India 0.487 0.513 65.0 61.8 47.8 73.4 56 64 $1,569 $4,130
99 Cambodia 0.517 0.483 59.8 52.4 64.1 84.7 54 64 $1,807 $2,368
100 Botswana 0.509 0.491 36.7 35.9 81.5 76.1 71 70 $6,617 $10,816
101 Comoros 0.498 0.502 65.4 61.1 49.1 63.5 42 51 $1,216 $2,206
102 Lao People's Dem.  Rep. 0.500 0.500 55.9 53.4 60.9 77.0 55 67 $1,391 $2,129
103 Papua New Guinea 0.484 0.516 56.0 54.9 50.9 63.4 37 44 $1,896 $3,305
104 Ghana 0.494 0.506 57.3 56.3 45.7 62.9 43 48 $1,915 $2,567
105 Bangladesh 0.489 0.511 63.7 62.1 31.4 50.3 54 52 $1,245 $2,289
106 Nepal 0.505 0.495 62.0 61.2 34.9 62.7 55 66 $949 $1,868
107 Pakistan 0.485 0.515 63.2 62.8 35.2 61.7 31 43 $1,050 $3,082
108 Congo 0.504 0.496 53.2 50.7 77.1 88.9 44 52 $689 $1,238
109 Uganda 0.500 0.500 47.6 46.9 59.2 78.8 72 75 $1,169 $1,751
110 Sudan 0.497 0.503 57.9 54.9 49.9 69.2 35 41 $918 $2,890
111 Zimbabwe 0.504 0.496 36.5 37.3 86.3 93.8 51 54 $1,751 $3,042
112 Togo 0.506 0.494 56.3 52.4 38.3 68.5 52 76 $1,092 $2,318
113 Cameroon 0.503 0.497 46.5 45.1 59.8 77.0 50 60 $1,310 $2,940
114 Lesotho 0.535 0.465 37.7 34.6 90.3 73.7 67 65 $1,480 $3,759
115 Swaziland 0.518 0.482 32.9 32.1 78.1 80.4 58 61 $2,669 $6,927
116 Madagascar 0.503 0.497 56.8 54.1 65.2 76.4 40 41 $603 $1,017
117 Kenya 0.499 0.501 46.3 48.1 70.2 77.7 50 53 $1,001 $1,078
118 Mauritania 0.506 0.494 54.3 51.1 43.4 59.5 43 47 $1,269 $2,284
119 Gambia 0.504 0.496 57.1 54.3 30.9 45.0 45 50 $1,391 $2,339
120 Senegal 0.508 0.492 56.9 54.5 29.2 51.1 37 43 $1,175 $2,131
121 Yemen 0.493 0.507 61.9 59.3 28.5 69.5 41 69 $413 $1,349
122 Rwanda 0.515 0.485 45.6 42.1 58.8 70.5 53 58 $985 $1,583
123 Nigeria 0.494 0.506 43.6 43.1 59.4 74.4 57 71 $614 $1,495
124 Angola 0.507 0.493 42.3 39.3 53.8 82.1 27 32 $1,797 $2,897
125 Eritrea 0.509 0.491 55.7 51.8 45.6 68.2 30 40 $579 $1,125
126 Benin 0.496 0.504 54.7 53.2 22.6 46.4 43 66 $910 $1,316
127 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0.503 0.497 46.3 45.5 62.2 77.5 40 42 $516 $725
128 Côte d'Ivoire 0.492 0.508 46.7 45.2 38.2 60.1 34 50 $792 $2,142
129 Malawi 0.504 0.496 39.6 39.8 54.0 74.9 69 75 $486 $717
130 Zambia 0.499 0.501 36.9 37.9 59.7 76.1 45 50 $629 $1,130
131 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0.504 0.496 44.1 42.1 51.9 79.8 24 31 $500 $903
132 Burundi 0.512 0.488 44.5 42.6 51.9 66.8 31 40 $545 $758
133 Mozambique 0.516 0.484 42.7 41.1 31.4 62.3 38 48 $910 $1,341
134 Ethiopia 0.503 0.497 48.7 46.6 33.8 49.2 29 42 $487 $931
135 Guinea-Bissau 0.506 0.494 46.2 43.2 24.7 55.2 29 45 $466 $960
136 Mali 0.502 0.498 48.5 47.2 11.9 26.7 27 38 $742 $1,247
137 Chad 0.505 0.495 44.7 42.5 12.7 40.6 28 48 $902 $1,525
138 Burkina Faso 0.497 0.503 48.2 46.8 8.1 18.5 20 27 $986 $1,357
139 Sierra Leone 0.507 0.493 42.1 39.4 20.5 39.8 38 52 $325 $783
140 Niger 0.489 0.511 44.4 44.3 9.4 19.6 17 25 $601 $1,056
Appendix Table A (continued): Data used in calculating GDI (2003)
Sources: UNDP, HDR 2005 Table 25; UNDP, World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database.
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 Appendix B: Replication  
 
The component indices, penalties, and GDI values used throughout this chapter are taken from 
the author’s best replication of GDI and not directly from HDR 2005. The use of a replication is 
necessary because the UNDP does not report component indices or penalty values. After 
comparing several replications, one stood out as the “best” replication because it most closely 
approximated the GDI values reported in HDR 2005. The following data and assumptions were 
used to calculate this replication: 
• Since the HDR 2005 does not report population shares by gender or cite the source of the 
population share data, projected female and male population shares for 2005 were taken 
from the UN’s World Population Prospects: The 2004 Revision Population Database. 
While data for 2003 were available, the 2005 data resulted in a closer approximation of 
the UNDP’s GDI values. (These data are reported in Appendix Table A.) 
• It is assumed that the UNDP has assigned the Czech Republic male and female adult 
literacy rates of 99.0%. No male and female adult literacy rates are reported for the Czech 
Republic, and there is no indication in HDR 2005 that a value of 99.0% will be assumed. 
The UNDP nonetheless, includes the Czech Republic in all of the HDR 2005 GDI 
calculations.  
• Combined gross school enrollment rates higher than 100 percent have been rounded 
down to 100 percent. There is no notation of this assumption in HDR 2005, but, based on 
footnotes to past years’ GDIs and footnotes to the HDI in HDR 2005 Table 1, it appears 
to be the UNDP’s practice. 
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UNDP's 
GDI rank
Replication 
rank
HDI 
rank Country EDH EDE EDY UNDP's GDI GDI replication
UNDP's GDI less 
replication
1 1 1 Norway 0.906 0.988 0.988 0.960 0.961 -0.001
2 2 3 Australia 0.921 0.993 0.947 0.954 0.954 0.000
3 3 2 Iceland 0.927 0.978 0.954 0.953 0.953 0.000
4 4 6 Sweden 0.919 0.993 0.929 0.947 0.947 0.000
5 5 5 Canada 0.915 0.973 0.950 0.946 0.946 0.000
6 6 7 Switzerland 0.923 0.960 0.954 0.946 0.946 0.000
7 7 4 Luxembourg 0.889 0.955 0.988 0.944 0.944 0.000
8 8 10 United States 0.872 0.970 0.983 0.942 0.942 0.000
9 9 9 Belgium 0.898 0.993 0.932 0.941 0.941 0.000
10 10 13 Finland 0.890 0.993 0.935 0.940 0.940 0.000
11 12 8 Ireland 0.878 0.970 0.969 0.939 0.939 0.000
12 11 12 Netherlands 0.890 0.990 0.938 0.939 0.939 0.000
13 13 14 Denmark 0.868 0.988 0.957 0.938 0.938 0.000
14 14 11 Japan 0.948 0.940 0.923 0.937 0.937 0.000
15 15 15 United Kingdom 0.888 0.993 0.928 0.937 0.937 0.000
16 16 16 France 0.908 0.967 0.931 0.935 0.935 0.000
17 18 19 New Zealand 0.901 0.983 0.900 0.929 0.928 0.001
18 17 18 Italy 0.917 0.950 0.918 0.928 0.928 0.000
19 19 17 Austria 0.898 0.957 0.923 0.926 0.926 0.000
20 20 20 Germany 0.893 0.957 0.928 0.926 0.926 0.000
21 21 21 Spain 0.909 0.972 0.885 0.922 0.922 0.000
22 23 22 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.944 0.865 0.925 0.912 0.911 0.001
23 22 23 Israel 0.911 0.950 0.874 0.911 0.911 0.000
24 24 24 Greece 0.888 0.967 0.866 0.907 0.907 0.000
25 25 25 Slovenia 0.856 0.978 0.871 0.901 0.902 -0.001
26 26 26 Portugal 0.871 0.972 0.857 0.900 0.900 0.000
27 27 27 Korea, Rep. of 0.865 0.971 0.851 0.896 0.896 0.000
28 28 28 Cyprus 0.893 0.907 0.854 0.884 0.885 -0.001
29 29 29 Barbados 0.833 0.957 0.837 0.876 0.875 0.001
30 30 30 Czech Republic 0.842 0.928 0.845 0.872 0.872 0.000
31 31 33 Hungary 0.795 0.959 0.825 0.860 0.860 0.000
32 32 31 Malta 0.889 0.849 0.838 0.858 0.859 -0.001
33 33 34 Poland 0.822 0.962 0.783 0.856 0.856 0.000
34 34 32 Argentina 0.824 0.965 0.772 0.854 0.854 0.000
35 35 36 Estonia 0.772 0.971 0.813 0.852 0.852 0.000
36 36 37 Lithuania 0.787 0.974 0.790 0.851 0.850 0.001
37 37 38 Slovakia 0.817 0.910 0.813 0.847 0.847 0.000
38 38 35 Chile 0.881 0.910 0.746 0.846 0.846 0.000
39 39 40 Kuwait 0.874 0.818 0.837 0.843 0.843 0.000
40 41 39 Bahrain 0.827 0.857 0.825 0.837 0.836 0.001
41 40 41 Croatia 0.832 0.904 0.776 0.837 0.837 0.000
42 42 42 Uruguay 0.839 0.945 0.725 0.836 0.836 0.000
43 43 44 Latvia 0.774 0.960 0.766 0.834 0.833 0.001
44 44 43 Costa Rica 0.888 0.865 0.735 0.829 0.829 0.000
45 45 46 Bulgaria 0.788 0.913 0.720 0.807 0.807 0.000
46 46 45 Mexico 0.834 0.852 0.726 0.804 0.804 0.000
47 47 47 Panama 0.831 0.876 0.691 0.800 0.799 0.001
48 48 48 Trinidad and Tobago 0.749 0.875 0.763 0.796 0.796 0.000
49 49 49 Macedonia, TFYR 0.813 0.874 0.694 0.794 0.794 0.000
50 50 50 Malaysia 0.804 0.826 0.744 0.791 0.791 0.000
51 51 52 Romania 0.773 0.887 0.707 0.789 0.789 0.000
52 52 51 Brazil 0.760 0.893 0.705 0.786 0.786 0.000
53 53 54 Belarus 0.719 0.955 0.679 0.785 0.785 0.000
54 54 53 Mauritius 0.787 0.798 0.760 0.781 0.782 -0.001
55 55 55 Colombia 0.789 0.863 0.688 0.780 0.780 0.000
56 56 57 Albania 0.814 0.888 0.626 0.776 0.776 0.000
57 57 58 Thailand 0.751 0.857 0.715 0.774 0.774 0.000
58 58 59 Venezuela 0.799 0.868 0.626 0.765 0.765 0.000
59 59 61 Ukraine 0.688 0.945 0.655 0.763 0.763 0.000
60 61 56 Oman 0.823 0.704 0.748 0.759 0.758 0.001
61 60 63 Kazakhstan 0.638 0.944 0.694 0.759 0.759 0.000
62 62 65 Armenia 0.773 0.899 0.596 0.756 0.756 0.000
63 63 66 Philippines 0.757 0.889 0.620 0.755 0.755 0.000
64 64 67 China 0.778 0.835 0.647 0.754 0.754 0.000
65 65 60 Saudi Arabia 0.784 0.713 0.750 0.749 0.749 0.000
66 66 73 Sri Lanka 0.819 0.829 0.594 0.747 0.747 0.000
67 67 62 Peru 0.751 0.876 0.609 0.745 0.745 0.000
68 68 64 Lebanon 0.783 0.838 0.613 0.745 0.745 0.000
69 69 69 Tunisia 0.805 0.740 0.683 0.743 0.743 0.000
70 72 68 Paraguay 0.766 0.856 0.604 0.742 0.742 0.000
Appendix Table B: GDI best replication (2003)
 
 29
UNDP's 
GDI rank
Replication 
rank
HDI 
rank Country EDH EDE EDY UNDP's GDI GDI replication
UNDP's GDI less 
replication
71 70 72 Fiji 0.715 0.863 0.650 0.742 0.743 -0.001
72 71 74 Turkey 0.730 0.811 0.686 0.742 0.742 0.000
73 73 70 Jordan 0.774 0.859 0.586 0.740 0.740 0.000
74 74 75 Dominican Republic 0.707 0.837 0.673 0.739 0.739 0.000
75 75 76 Jamaica 0.762 0.830 0.614 0.736 0.735 0.001
76 76 71 Belize 0.783 0.769 0.648 0.734 0.734 0.000
77 77 78 Azerbaijan 0.698 0.889 0.589 0.725 0.725 0.000
78 78 77 Iran, Islamic Rep. of 0.757 0.738 0.663 0.719 0.719 0.000
79 79 83 Guyana 0.634 0.916 0.598 0.716 0.716 0.000
80 80 80 El Salvador 0.764 0.756 0.624 0.715 0.715 0.000
81 81 81 Cape Verde 0.752 0.748 0.642 0.714 0.714 0.000
82 82 79 Algeria 0.768 0.705 0.645 0.706 0.706 0.000
83 83 82 Syrian Arab Republic 0.806 0.754 0.547 0.702 0.702 0.000
84 84 84 Viet Nam 0.760 0.815 0.532 0.702 0.702 0.000
85 85 85 Kyrgyzstan 0.698 0.930 0.471 0.700 0.700 0.000
86 86 87 Uzbekistan 0.693 0.913 0.471 0.692 0.692 0.000
87 87 86 Indonesia 0.697 0.805 0.572 0.691 0.692 -0.001
88 88 88 Nicaragua 0.745 0.743 0.561 0.683 0.683 0.000
89 89 89 Bolivia 0.652 0.864 0.522 0.679 0.679 0.000
90 90 90 Mongolia 0.652 0.900 0.481 0.677 0.678 -0.001
91 91 91 Moldova, Rep. of 0.710 0.848 0.446 0.668 0.668 0.000
92 92 93 South Africa 0.391 0.810 0.756 0.652 0.652 0.000
93 93 95 Tajikistan 0.644 0.911 0.393 0.650 0.649 0.001
94 94 92 Guatemala 0.705 0.661 0.581 0.649 0.649 0.000
95 95 94 Equatorial Guinea 0.301 0.773 0.850 0.641 0.641 0.000
96 96 97 Namibia 0.386 0.804 0.675 0.621 0.622 -0.001
97 97 96 Morocco 0.745 0.514 0.589 0.616 0.616 0.000
98 98 98 India 0.640 0.590 0.530 0.586 0.587 -0.001
99 99 99 Cambodia 0.518 0.679 0.504 0.567 0.567 0.000
100 100 100 Botswana 0.181 0.760 0.738 0.559 0.560 -0.001
101 101 101 Comoros 0.637 0.523 0.462 0.541 0.541 0.000
102 102 102 Lao People's Dem.  Rep. 0.493 0.655 0.472 0.540 0.540 0.000
103 103 105 Papua New Guinea 0.506 0.512 0.535 0.518 0.518 0.000
104 104 106 Ghana 0.528 0.506 0.516 0.517 0.517 0.000
105 105 107 Bangladesh 0.631 0.442 0.467 0.514 0.514 0.000
106 106 104 Nepal 0.608 0.503 0.424 0.511 0.512 -0.001
107 107 103 Pakistan 0.632 0.423 0.468 0.508 0.508 0.000
108 108 109 Congo 0.448 0.709 0.364 0.507 0.507 0.000
109 109 111 Uganda 0.367 0.698 0.442 0.502 0.502 0.000
110 110 108 Sudan 0.523 0.514 0.447 0.495 0.494 0.001
111 111 112 Zimbabwe 0.186 0.774 0.519 0.493 0.493 0.000
112 112 110 Togo 0.489 0.533 0.453 0.491 0.491 0.000
113 113 115 Cameroon 0.344 0.630 0.487 0.487 0.487 0.000
114 114 116 Lesotho 0.183 0.766 0.511 0.487 0.487 0.000
115 115 114 Swaziland 0.114 0.726 0.615 0.485 0.485 0.000
116 116 113 Madagascar 0.507 0.604 0.338 0.483 0.483 0.000
117 117 119 Kenya 0.361 0.663 0.391 0.472 0.472 0.000
118 118 118 Mauritania 0.461 0.485 0.467 0.471 0.471 0.000
119 119 120 Gambia 0.511 0.403 0.478 0.464 0.464 0.000
120 120 121 Senegal 0.510 0.383 0.455 0.449 0.449 0.000
121 121 117 Yemen 0.593 0.446 0.308 0.448 0.449 -0.001
122 122 123 Rwanda 0.313 0.611 0.416 0.447 0.447 0.000
123 123 122 Nigeria 0.302 0.652 0.363 0.439 0.439 0.000
124 124 124 Angola 0.262 0.531 0.518 0.438 0.437 0.001
125 125 125 Eritrea 0.479 0.477 0.339 0.431 0.432 -0.001
126 126 126 Benin 0.481 0.379 0.397 0.419 0.419 0.000
127 127 128 Tanzania, U. Rep. of 0.345 0.597 0.299 0.414 0.414 0.000
128 128 127 Côte d'Ivoire 0.347 0.448 0.414 0.403 0.403 0.000
129 129 129 Malawi 0.237 0.660 0.293 0.396 0.396 0.000
130 130 130 Zambia 0.195 0.605 0.349 0.383 0.383 0.000
131 131 131 Congo, Dem. Rep. of the 0.299 0.509 0.310 0.373 0.373 0.000
132 132 133 Burundi 0.306 0.504 0.307 0.373 0.373 0.000
133 133 132 Mozambique 0.278 0.421 0.397 0.365 0.365 0.000
134 134 134 Ethiopia 0.376 0.381 0.309 0.355 0.355 0.000
135 135 135 Guinea-Bissau 0.327 0.346 0.305 0.326 0.326 0.000
136 136 137 Mali 0.378 0.217 0.373 0.323 0.323 0.000
137 137 136 Chad 0.308 0.251 0.406 0.322 0.322 0.000
138 138 138 Burkina Faso 0.373 0.154 0.407 0.311 0.311 0.000
139 139 139 Sierra Leone 0.261 0.328 0.249 0.279 0.279 0.000
140 140 140 Niger 0.318 0.154 0.341 0.271 0.271 0.000
Appendix Table B (continued): GDI best replication (2003)
Source: HDR 2005, and author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
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Appendix C: Hidden Penalty 
The impact of the order of operations is demonstrated in Tables C1 and C2. In Table C1, first a 
weighted average of log female and male income is taken; this is the order of calculations in 
Weighted HDI (Column 5): 
(20) A = [FemalePopShare * ln(Female-Y)] + [MalePopShare * ln(Male-Y)] 
Then a log is taken of the weighted average of the female and male incomes; this is the order of 
calculations in HDI (Column 6):  
(21) B = ln[(FemalePopShare * Female-Y) + (MalePopShare * Male-Y)] 
As long as female and male incomes are not equal, different orders of operation achieve different 
results. 
Female 
Share
Male 
Share
Female 
Value
Male 
Value
Weighted 
Average of 
Log Value (A)
Log Value of  
Weighted 
Average (B) Difference
0.50 0.50 $100 $100 4.61 4.61 0.00
0.50 0.50 $100 $200 4.95 5.01 -0.06
0.50 0.50 $100 $1,000 5.76 6.31 -0.55
0.50 0.50 $100 $10,000 6.91 8.53 -1.62
0.45 0.55 $100 $100 4.61 4.61 0.00
0.45 0.55 $100 $200 4.99 5.04 -0.06
0.45 0.55 $100 $1,000 5.87 6.39 -0.52
0.45 0.55 $100 $10,000 7.14 8.62 -1.48
0.55 0.45 $100 $100 4.61 4.61 0.00
0.55 0.45 $100 $200 4.92 4.98 -0.06
0.55 0.45 $100 $1,000 5.64 6.22 -0.58
0.55 0.45 $100 $10,000 6.68 8.42 -1.75
Table C1: Demonstration of impact of the order of calculations for income
Source: Author's calculations.  
In the health and education components, HDI’s first weighted average then normalization order 
of operations returns a much more similar result to Weighted-HDI’s normalization then average; 
but taking a log at a different stage of the calculation, as occurs in the income component, makes 
a much larger difference. For EDH, as long as female and male population shares are equal, then 
the order of operations is irrelevant. If the female population share is less than the male, there is a 
bonus to the Weighted-HDI on the order of one-tenth of one percent as compared to HDI, but if 
the female population share is greater, there is a penalty to Weighted-HDI on the same order of 
magnitude. For EDE, regardless of balance of the population shares, there is a somewhat larger 
penalty to Weighted-HDI, on the order of magnitude of one to ten percent of HDI. Table C2 
demonstrates these results. 
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Female 
Share
Male 
Share
Female 
Value
Male 
Value
Weighted Average of 
Normalized Index
Normalization of 
Weighted Average Difference
0.50 0.50 50 50 0.417 0.417 0.000
0.50 0.50 60 50 0.500 0.500 0.000
0.50 0.50 80 50 0.667 0.667 0.000
0.50 0.50 40 50 0.333 0.333 0.000
0.48 0.52 50 50 0.418 0.417 0.002
0.48 0.52 60 50 0.498 0.497 0.002
0.48 0.52 80 50 0.658 0.657 0.002
0.48 0.52 40 50 0.338 0.337 0.002
0.52 0.48 50 50 0.415 0.417 -0.002
0.52 0.48 60 50 0.502 0.503 -0.002
0.52 0.48 80 50 0.675 0.677 -0.002
0.52 0.48 40 50 0.328 0.330 -0.002
0.50 0.50 70 70 0.700 0.750 -0.050
0.50 0.50 70 90 0.800 0.917 -0.117
0.50 0.50 70 100 0.850 1.000 -0.150
0.50 0.50 70 60 0.650 0.667 -0.017
0.48 0.52 70 70 0.700 0.750 -0.050
0.48 0.52 70 90 0.804 0.923 -0.119
0.48 0.52 70 100 0.856 1.010 -0.154
0.48 0.52 70 60 0.648 0.663 -0.015
0.52 0.48 70 70 0.700 0.750 -0.050
0.52 0.48 70 90 0.796 0.910 -0.114
0.52 0.48 70 100 0.844 0.990 -0.146
0.52 0.48 70 60 0.652 0.670 -0.018
Table C2: Demonstration of impact of the order of calculations in health and education
Source: Author's calculations.
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Appendix D: Valuing Gender Equality 
Table D: Rankings of GDIs with higher penalty factors (2003)
Rank Weighted HDI GDI GDI ε = 10 GDI ε = 100 Rank Weighted HDI GDI GDI ε = 10 GDI ε = 100
1 Norway Norway Norway Norway 71 Turkey Turkey Oman Peru
2 Australia Australia Australia Australia 72 Fiji Paraguay Tunisia Turkey
3 Iceland Iceland Iceland Switzerland 73 Jordan Jordan Peru Tunisia
4 Sweden Sweden Sweden Iceland 74 Dominican R. Dominican R. Jordan Belize
5 Canada Canada Switzerland Luxembourg 75 Belize Jamaica Saudi Arabia Jordan
6 Switzerland Switzerland Canada Sweden 76 Jamaica Belize Azerbaijan Oman
7 Luxembourg Luxembourg Luxembourg Canada 77 Azerbaijan Azerbaijan Belize Guyana
8 U.S. U.S. U.S. Denmark 78 Iran Iran El Salvador Saudi Arabia
9 Belgium Belgium Finland Finland 79 Guyana Guyana Guyana El Salvador
10 Ireland Finland Belgium U.S. 80 El Salvador El Salvador Cape Verde Viet Nam
11 Netherlands Netherlands Denmark U.K. 81 Cape Verde Cape Verde Iran Kyrgyzstan
12 Finland Ireland Netherlands Belgium 82 Algeria Algeria Viet Nam Cape Verde
13 Japan Denmark U.K. Netherlands 83 Syria Syria Kyrgyzstan Uzbekistan
14 Denmark Japan Ireland France 84 Viet Nam Viet Nam Uzbekistan Iran
15 U.K. U.K. France N.Zealand 85 Kyrgyzstan Kyrgyzstan Indonesia Indonesia
16 France France Japan Ireland 86 Indonesia Uzbekistan Algeria Nicaragua
17 Italy Italy N.Zealand Japan 87 Uzbekistan Indonesia Syria Mongolia
18 Austria N.Zealand Italy Germany 88 Nicaragua Nicaragua Nicaragua Algeria
19 N.Zealand Austria Germany Italy 89 Bolivia Bolivia Mongolia Syria
20 Germany Germany Austria Austria 90 Mongolia Mongolia Bolivia Moldova
21 Spain Spain Spain Spain 91 Moldova Moldova Moldova Bolivia
22 Israel Israel Israel Israel 92 Guatemala South Africa South Africa Tajikistan
23 Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong Hong Kong 93 South Africa Tajikistan Tajikistan South Africa
24 Greece Greece Greece Greece 94 Tajikistan Guatemala Guatemala Guatemala
25 Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia Slovenia 95 Eq. Guinea Eq. Guinea Eq. Guinea Namibia
26 Portugal Portugal Portugal Portugal 96 Morocco Namibia Namibia Eq. Guinea
27 S.Korea S.Korea S.Korea S.Korea 97 Namibia Morocco Morocco Morocco
28 Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus Cyprus 98 India India India Botswana
29 Barbados Barbados Barbados Czech Rep. 99 Cambodia Cambodia Cambodia India
30 Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Czech Rep. Barbados 100 Botswana Botswana Botswana Cambodia
31 Malta Hungary Hungary Hungary 101 Comoros Comoros Laos Comoros
32 Hungary Malta Poland Poland 102 Laos Laos Comoros Laos
33 Poland Poland Malta Malta 103 Pakistan Papua N.G. Papua N.G. Ghana
34 Argentina Argentina Estonia Slovakia 104 Nepal Ghana Ghana Papua N.G.
35 Estonia Estonia Lithuania Lithuania 105 Papua N.G. Bangladesh Bangladesh Bangladesh
36 Lithuania Lithuania Slovakia Argentina 106 Ghana Nepal Congo Congo
37 Chile Slovakia Argentina Chile 107 Bangladesh Pakistan Uganda Uganda
38 Slovakia Chile Chile Estonia 108 Congo Congo Nepal Zimbabwe
39 Kuwait Kuwait Croatia Croatia 109 Uganda Uganda Zimbabwe Nepal
40 Bahrain Croatia Kuwait Uruguay 110 Togo Sudan Madagascar Madagascar
41 Croatia Bahrain Uruguay Kuwait 111 Sudan Zimbabwe Pakistan Swaziland
42 Uruguay Uruguay Latvia Costa Rica 112 Zimbabwe Togo Lesotho Kenya
43 Latvia Latvia Bahrain Latvia 113 Cameroon Cameroon Swaziland Lesotho
44 Costa Rica Costa Rica Costa Rica Bahrain 114 Lesotho Lesotho Sudan Sudan
45 Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria Bulgaria 115 Swaziland Swaziland Cameroon Pakistan
46 Mexico Mexico Mexico Panama 116 Madagascar Madagascar Kenya Cameroon
47 Panama Panama Panama Mexico 117 Yemen Kenya Togo Togo
48 Trin. & Tob. Trin. & Tob. Macedonia Macedonia 118 Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania Mauritania
49 Macedonia Macedonia Trin. & Tob. Trin. & Tob. 119 Kenya Gambia Gambia Gambia
50 Malaysia Malaysia Romania Romania 120 Gambia Senegal Rwanda Rwanda
51 Romania Romania Malaysia Malaysia 121 Senegal Yemen Senegal Senegal
52 Brazil Brazil Belarus Colombia 122 Rwanda Rwanda Angola Angola
53 Belarus Belarus Brazil Albania 123 Nigeria Nigeria Nigeria Eritrea
54 Mauritius Mauritius Colombia Brazil 124 Angola Angola Eritrea Nigeria
55 Colombia Colombia Albania Belarus 125 Eritrea Eritrea Tanzania Yemen
56 Albania Albania Thailand Thailand 126 Benin Benin Yemen Tanzania
57 Thailand Thailand Mauritius Mauritius 127 Tanzania Tanzania Benin Benin
58 Oman Venezuela Venezuela Armenia 128 Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire Malawi Malawi
59 Venezuela Ukraine Armenia Venezuela 129 Malawi Malawi Côte d'Ivoire Côte d'Ivoire
60 Ukraine Kazakhstan Ukraine Philippines 130 Zambia Zambia Zambia Burundi
61 Kazakhstan Oman Philippines China 131 Congo, D.R. Congo, D.R. Burundi Zambia
62 Saudi Arabia Armenia Kazakhstan Kazakhstan 132 Mozambique Burundi Congo, D.R. Congo, D.R.
63 Armenia Philippines China Sri Lanka 133 Burundi Mozambique Mozambique Mozambique
64 Philippines China Sri Lanka Ukraine 134 Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia Ethiopia
65 China Saudi Arabia Fiji Fiji 135 Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau Mali Mali
66 Peru Sri Lanka Jamaica Paraguay 136 Chad Mali Burkina Faso Burkina Faso
67 Lebanon Peru Lebanon Jamaica 137 Mali Chad Chad Chad
68 Sri Lanka Lebanon Turkey Lebanon 138 Burkina Faso Burkina Faso Guinea-Bissau Guinea-Bissau
69 Tunisia Tunisia Paraguay Dominican R. 139 Sierra Leone Sierra Leone Niger Sierra Leone
70 Paraguay Fiji Dominican R. Azerbaijan 140 Niger Niger Sierra Leone Niger
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.  
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Appendix E: Regarding the Direction of Penalties 
Table E: Female versus male component indices and HDIs for selected countries (2003)
Country Female Male Gap Female Male Gap Female Male Gap Female Male Gap
1 Norway 0.907 0.905 0.002 0.993 0.983 0.010 0.964 1.013 -0.048 0.955 0.967 -0.012
2 Australia 0.922 0.920 0.002 0.993 0.993 0.000 0.920 0.975 -0.055 0.945 0.963 -0.018
3 Iceland 0.918 0.937 -0.018 0.993 0.963 0.030 0.924 0.987 -0.062 0.945 0.962 -0.017
4 Sweden 0.915 0.923 -0.008 0.993 0.993 0.000 0.899 0.961 -0.062 0.936 0.959 -0.024
5 Canada 0.915 0.915 0.000 0.980 0.967 0.013 0.914 0.990 -0.075 0.936 0.957 -0.021
6 Switzerland 0.928 0.918 0.010 0.953 0.967 -0.013 0.946 0.964 -0.017 0.943 0.950 -0.007
7 Luxembourg 0.900 0.878 0.022 0.957 0.953 0.003 0.977 1.000 -0.023 0.945 0.944 0.001
8 United States 0.875 0.868 0.007 0.983 0.957 0.027 0.946 1.025 -0.079 0.935 0.950 -0.015
9 Belgium 0.908 0.887 0.022 0.993 0.993 0.000 0.884 0.987 -0.103 0.929 0.956 -0.027
10 Finland 0.903 0.877 0.027 0.993 0.993 0.000 0.909 0.964 -0.055 0.935 0.945 -0.009
11 Netherlands 0.893 0.887 0.007 0.990 0.990 0.000 0.889 0.993 -0.105 0.924 0.957 -0.033
12 Ireland 0.880 0.877 0.003 0.983 0.957 0.027 0.901 1.049 -0.148 0.921 0.961 -0.039
13 Denmark 0.865 0.872 -0.007 0.993 0.983 0.010 0.932 0.984 -0.053 0.930 0.946 -0.016
14 Japan 0.965 0.932 0.033 0.937 0.943 -0.007 0.865 0.994 -0.129 0.922 0.956 -0.034
15 United Kingdom 0.885 0.892 -0.007 0.993 0.993 0.000 0.891 0.971 -0.081 0.923 0.952 -0.029
16 France 0.925 0.890 0.035 0.973 0.960 0.013 0.890 0.978 -0.089 0.929 0.943 -0.013
17 Italy 0.927 0.907 0.020 0.957 0.943 0.013 0.859 0.990 -0.131 0.914 0.947 -0.033
18 New Zealand 0.897 0.905 -0.008 0.993 0.973 0.020 0.870 0.934 -0.064 0.920 0.937 -0.017
19 Austria 0.905 0.892 0.013 0.960 0.953 0.007 0.846 1.020 -0.175 0.904 0.955 -0.052
20 Germany 0.900 0.887 0.013 0.953 0.960 -0.007 0.880 0.984 -0.103 0.911 0.943 -0.032
21 Spain 0.928 0.890 0.038 0.980 0.963 0.017 0.823 0.959 -0.136 0.910 0.938 -0.027
23 Hong Kong, China (SAR) 0.952 0.937 0.015 0.841 0.893 -0.052 0.881 0.978 -0.097 0.891 0.936 -0.045
24 Greece 0.890 0.885 0.005 0.970 0.963 0.007 0.806 0.938 -0.132 0.889 0.929 -0.040
25 Slovenia 0.875 0.837 0.038 0.990 0.967 0.023 0.834 0.913 -0.080 0.900 0.906 -0.006
26 Portugal 0.885 0.857 0.028 0.983 0.960 0.023 0.811 0.914 -0.103 0.893 0.910 -0.017
27 Korea, Rep. of 0.885 0.847 0.038 0.950 0.993 -0.043 0.795 0.916 -0.121 0.877 0.919 -0.042
28 Cyprus 0.893 0.893 0.000 0.897 0.917 -0.020 0.797 0.923 -0.126 0.863 0.911 -0.049
29 Barbados 0.850 0.815 0.035 0.973 0.940 0.033 0.799 0.882 -0.083 0.874 0.879 -0.005
30 Czech Republic 0.853 0.830 0.023 0.930 0.927 0.003 0.810 0.885 -0.074 0.865 0.880 -0.016
31 Hungary 0.822 0.768 0.053 0.967 0.950 0.017 0.789 0.868 -0.080 0.859 0.862 -0.003
32 Malta 0.888 0.890 -0.002 0.861 0.836 0.025 0.767 0.925 -0.158 0.839 0.884 -0.045
33 Poland 0.848 0.797 0.052 0.970 0.953 0.017 0.747 0.827 -0.080 0.855 0.859 -0.004
34 Argentina 0.845 0.803 0.042 0.978 0.951 0.027 0.700 0.865 -0.165 0.841 0.873 -0.032
35 Estonia 0.825 0.718 0.107 0.990 0.950 0.040 0.781 0.855 -0.074 0.865 0.841 0.024
36 Lithuania 0.838 0.735 0.103 0.987 0.960 0.027 0.762 0.826 -0.064 0.862 0.840 0.022
37 Slovakia 0.840 0.793 0.047 0.913 0.907 0.007 0.780 0.852 -0.072 0.844 0.851 -0.006
38 Chile 0.890 0.872 0.018 0.907 0.912 -0.005 0.676 0.835 -0.159 0.825 0.873 -0.048
39 Kuwait 0.867 0.878 -0.012 0.823 0.815 0.009 0.740 0.916 -0.176 0.810 0.870 -0.060
40 Croatia 0.848 0.815 0.033 0.901 0.907 -0.006 0.732 0.829 -0.097 0.827 0.850 -0.023
42 Uruguay 0.858 0.820 0.038 0.964 0.925 0.039 0.677 0.784 -0.107 0.833 0.843 -0.010
43 Latvia 0.825 0.722 0.103 0.977 0.940 0.037 0.732 0.811 -0.079 0.845 0.824 0.020
44 Costa Rica 0.885 0.890 -0.005 0.869 0.861 0.008 0.661 0.825 -0.164 0.805 0.859 -0.054
45 Bulgaria 0.802 0.773 0.028 0.911 0.915 -0.003 0.689 0.757 -0.068 0.801 0.815 -0.014
47 Panama 0.832 0.830 0.002 0.881 0.870 0.011 0.639 0.752 -0.113 0.784 0.817 -0.033
48 Trinidad and Tobago 0.758 0.740 0.018 0.876 0.873 0.003 0.704 0.834 -0.130 0.779 0.816 -0.036
49 Macedonia, TFYR 0.813 0.813 0.000 0.864 0.885 -0.021 0.648 0.746 -0.098 0.775 0.815 -0.039
51 Romania 0.792 0.755 0.037 0.885 0.889 -0.004 0.665 0.756 -0.090 0.781 0.800 -0.019
52 Brazil 0.785 0.735 0.050 0.901 0.885 0.015 0.643 0.784 -0.141 0.776 0.801 -0.025
53 Belarus 0.775 0.665 0.110 0.963 0.947 0.017 0.648 0.719 -0.071 0.795 0.777 0.018
54 Mauritius 0.803 0.772 0.032 0.773 0.825 -0.051 0.686 0.853 -0.168 0.754 0.817 -0.062
55 Colombia 0.798 0.780 0.018 0.871 0.855 0.016 0.637 0.749 -0.112 0.769 0.795 -0.026
56 Albania 0.820 0.808 0.012 0.889 0.887 0.002 0.582 0.679 -0.097 0.764 0.791 -0.028
57 Thailand 0.772 0.730 0.042 0.843 0.873 -0.029 0.677 0.759 -0.082 0.764 0.787 -0.023
58 Venezuela 0.807 0.792 0.015 0.871 0.865 0.006 0.561 0.707 -0.146 0.746 0.788 -0.042
59 Ukraine 0.750 0.627 0.123 0.950 0.940 0.010 0.611 0.717 -0.106 0.770 0.761 0.009
60 Kazakhstan 0.692 0.588 0.103 0.950 0.937 0.013 0.660 0.736 -0.076 0.767 0.754 0.014
62 Armenia 0.787 0.758 0.028 0.907 0.890 0.017 0.569 0.630 -0.061 0.754 0.759 -0.005
63 Philippines 0.750 0.763 -0.013 0.895 0.883 0.011 0.579 0.666 -0.087 0.741 0.771 -0.030
66 Sri Lanka 0.822 0.817 0.005 0.821 0.838 -0.017 0.542 0.653 -0.111 0.728 0.769 -0.041
67 Peru 0.752 0.750 0.002 0.841 0.913 -0.073 0.518 0.737 -0.218 0.704 0.800 -0.096
74 Dominican Republic 0.725 0.690 0.035 0.852 0.823 0.029 0.598 0.768 -0.169 0.725 0.760 -0.035
75 Jamaica 0.750 0.775 -0.025 0.866 0.795 0.071 0.583 0.651 -0.069 0.733 0.740 -0.008
76 Belize 0.783 0.783 0.000 0.774 0.765 0.009 0.550 0.787 -0.237 0.702 0.778 -0.076
77 Azerbaijan 0.717 0.678 0.038 0.881 0.897 -0.015 0.549 0.639 -0.090 0.716 0.738 -0.022
79 Guyana 0.643 0.625 0.018 0.915 0.917 -0.002 0.532 0.688 -0.155 0.697 0.743 -0.046
80 El Salvador 0.773 0.755 0.018 0.737 0.776 -0.039 0.564 0.702 -0.137 0.692 0.744 -0.053
81 Cape Verde 0.762 0.742 0.020 0.697 0.813 -0.116 0.588 0.712 -0.124 0.682 0.756 -0.073
85 Kyrgyzstan 0.727 0.670 0.057 0.931 0.930 0.001 0.439 0.510 -0.071 0.699 0.703 -0.005
86 Uzbekistan 0.705 0.682 0.023 0.906 0.921 -0.015 0.439 0.508 -0.069 0.683 0.703 -0.020
88 Nicaragua 0.743 0.747 -0.003 0.747 0.739 0.009 0.501 0.636 -0.134 0.664 0.707 -0.043
90 Mongolia 0.643 0.660 -0.017 0.917 0.883 0.033 0.450 0.518 -0.068 0.670 0.687 -0.017
91 Moldova, Rep. of 0.730 0.690 0.040 0.847 0.850 -0.003 0.415 0.487 -0.072 0.664 0.676 -0.012
93 Tajikistan 0.647 0.642 0.005 0.890 0.933 -0.043 0.358 0.436 -0.079 0.632 0.670 -0.039
94 Guatemala 0.725 0.685 0.040 0.619 0.713 -0.094 0.506 0.689 -0.183 0.617 0.695 -0.079
99 Cambodia 0.538 0.498 0.040 0.607 0.778 -0.171 0.483 0.528 -0.045 0.543 0.602 -0.059
100 Botswana 0.153 0.223 -0.070 0.780 0.741 0.039 0.700 0.782 -0.082 0.544 0.582 -0.038
114 Lesotho 0.170 0.202 -0.032 0.825 0.708 0.117 0.450 0.605 -0.156 0.482 0.505 -0.023
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data; shading indicates female greater than male indices.
HDI
GDI rank
H Index E Index Y Index
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Appendix F: Rewarding Gender Mortality Bias 
Each section of rows in Table F illustrates how the component index value for a given country 
changes when different gender population shares are applied. (The shaded row in each section 
indicates the country’s actual population shares.) The range of female population shares in Table 
F (0.550 to 0.400) approximates the actual range among the countries for which GDI calculations 
are reported in HDR 2005. 
For Belgium’s income component, the penalty (or difference between using ε = 0 and ε = 2) 
stays the same when the population shares are varied, but the value of EDY (ε = 2) increases as 
the female population share shrinks – the less women living in Belgium, the higher the EDY. 
Similarly, for Estonia’s life expectancy component – where, in contrast to Belgium’s income 
component, the female index is larger than the male index – the penalty again stays the same and 
the EDH decreases as the female population share declines. For Algeria’s income component – 
where the gap between the female and male indices is twice the size of those in the previous two 
examples – the same type of results holds. Finally, in extreme cases like Yemen’s education 
component, where the gap between female and male indices is at its largest, as female population 
share decreases, not only does the EDY increase, but the size of the penalty itself also increases. 
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Female Male Female Male ε = 0 ε = 2 Penalty
0.550 0.450 0.884 0.987 0.930 0.928 0.003
0.509 0.491 0.884 0.987 0.935 0.932 0.003
0.505 0.495 0.884 0.987 0.935 0.932 0.003
0.500 0.500 0.884 0.987 0.936 0.933 0.003
0.450 0.550 0.884 0.987 0.941 0.938 0.003
0.400 0.600 0.884 0.987 0.946 0.943 0.003
0.550 0.450 0.825 0.718 0.777 0.773 0.004
0.540 0.460 0.825 0.718 0.776 0.772 0.004
0.505 0.495 0.825 0.718 0.772 0.768 0.004
0.500 0.500 0.825 0.718 0.772 0.768 0.004
0.450 0.550 0.825 0.718 0.766 0.763 0.004
0.400 0.600 0.825 0.718 0.761 0.757 0.004
0.550 0.450 0.562 0.756 0.649 0.635 0.014
0.505 0.495 0.562 0.756 0.658 0.643 0.014
0.500 0.500 0.562 0.756 0.659 0.644 0.014
0.496 0.504 0.562 0.756 0.660 0.645 0.014
0.450 0.550 0.562 0.756 0.668 0.654 0.014
0.400 0.600 0.562 0.756 0.678 0.664 0.014
0.550 0.450 0.327 0.693 0.492 0.429 0.063
0.505 0.495 0.327 0.693 0.508 0.443 0.066
0.500 0.500 0.327 0.693 0.510 0.444 0.066
0.493 0.507 0.327 0.693 0.513 0.446 0.066
0.450 0.550 0.327 0.693 0.528 0.461 0.068
0.400 0.600 0.327 0.693 0.547 0.478 0.068
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Table F: Demonstration of gender mortality bias in GDI (2003)
Source: Author's calculations using HDR 2005 data.
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